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Freeing the Press from Editorial Discretion and Hegemony in
Bona Fide News: Why the Revolution Must be Televised
Akilah N. Folami
ABSTRACT
Broadcast journalism's foundational role of informing and engaging the
American public in order to further America's self-governing democracy is in
crisis. Corporate broadcast owners' efforts to maximize profits and increase
advertising revenue during traditional network news and related public affairs
programming have led to the closing of many investigative and correspondent
television news bureaus and have arguably hastened the devolution of broadcast
journalism into a depoliticized spectacle filled with political and celebrity, gossipdriven infotainment.1 Furthermore, as viewers have abdicated their reliance on
broadcast journalism as their primary source of political knowledge, they have also
disengaged from professional broadcast journalists' dispassionate, impartial and
aspirationally objective method and manner of presentation. 2 This Article contends
that these definitional shifts in viewer engagement, which serve as underlying
challenges to broadcast journalism's deliberative role, are the symptoms, rather
than the root cause of its deliberative peril. These shifts are instead the net effect of
long-standing mainstream societal norms and presumptions that led to the
narrowing in scope and definition of civic engagement.
Specifically, such mainstream norms presume a disengagement between civic
knowledge and participation on the one hand, and the various expressive modes
(and whims) of popular culture, entertainment and discourse on the other. This
assumption of a necessary disjuncture between reason and emotions, particularly
with pleasure, was reflected in traditional news programming formats and
personified by professional broadcast journalists during the Golden Age of
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1.
BONNIE M. ANDERSON, NEWSFLASH: JOURNALISM, INFOTAINMENT, AND THE BOTTOM-LINE
BUSINESS OF BROADCAST NEWS, at x, xi (2004); GEOFFREY BAYM, FROM CRONKITE TO COLBERT: THE
EVOLUTION OF BROADCAST NEWS 3, 5, 56 (2010).
2.
BAYM, supra note 1, at 16, 106.

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS

[34:3

journalism. This Article posits that these norms were further solidified and
reinforced by the creation and early interpretation of the bona fide newscast and
news interview exemptions to the equal time rule, which absent application of any
of the bona fide news exemptions, required broadcast owners to provide equal
access time on a particular program to opposing political candidates if access on
had been granted to any other candidate running for the same
such programs
3
office.
In revisiting the equal time rule and bona fide news and newscast exemptions,
this Article sheds light on how early interpretations of these exemptions helped to
solidify network news's hegemony over who could construct, and what would be
construed as, accepted political news. More specifically, this Article contends that
these hegemonic presumptions and their legal reifications, as embodied in early
interpretations of the bona fide news and newscast exemptions, resulted in a
political culture and discourse that was aesthetically sterile. Indeed, for the first
three decades following their enactment, the bona fide news and newscast
exemptions were only applied to candidate appearances on network news and
public affairs programming anchored by professional broadcast journalists like
Walter Cronkite. The resulting political discourse was primarily constructed as a
white and male one, and thus marginalized the concerns of non-whites and nonmales. Furthermore, such an aesthetically limiting and sterile discourse may have
impaired the participatory agency of citizens.
While this Article acknowledges that media consolidation has contributed to the
hyper-commercialized and sensationalized spectacle that currently predominates
broadcast news programming, it maintains that a return to the norms of the Golden
Age that separated news from entertainment, and reason from the pleasurable, is
not the answer to addressing broadcast journalism's peril in engaging the public.
After all, to do so would simply ignore the extent to which political news presented
in certain entertainment formats (like "The Daily Show") not only has become
widely popular, but also has served as a key deliberative tool that attracts and
engages viewers in a subversive political discourse apart from the mainstream spin.
Therefore, media policy should proactively provide the political news necessary for
maintaining self-governance, irrespective of whether such news is provided in a
traditional news format and/or in an entertaining one. The pay and compete model
discussed herein is not only a step in the direction of restoring broadcast
journalism's deliberative role, but also a step towards facilitating foundational
American ideals of a widely engaged and participatory citizenry.

3. Equal Time Amendment to Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 86-274, 73 Stat. 557
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (2006)).
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The revolution will not be televised; You will not be able to plug in,
turn on and cop out;
You will not be able to skip out for a beer duringcommercials.
Because, the revolution will not be televised.
There will be no highlights on the eleven o 'clock news.
The revolution will not be right back after a message.
The revolution will not go better with Coke,
The revolution will not fight the germs that may cause bad breath.4

Television and everyday life. . are.. . structured,contingent, and mediatedby
power... in ways that are highly complex and contradictory. Power is
multidimensionaland so must emancipatorystrategiesbe .... To ignorepower
relations,not to mention the politicaleconomy of both television and everyday life,
is profoundly to cripple one's capacityfor criticalanalysis.5

INTRODUCTION
In an online poll conducted by Time Magazine in 2009, comedian Jon Stewart
was voted as America's Most Trusted News Anchorman for his performance as a
"fake" news journalist on his widely popular "fake" news comedy, "The Daily
Show," which aired on the cable channel Comedy Central. 6 To the surprise of
many, Stewart beat out veteran and professional broadcast journalists Brian
Williams, Katie Couric and Charlie Gibson, who anchored nightly news and public
affairs programming televised on the three major networks, NBC, CBS and ABC,
respectively. 7 Many saw the results of the poll as a telling manifestation of the
challenges broadcast journalism has faced in serving its foundational and historic
role of civically attracting and engaging the American public. 8 Some contend that
broadcast journalism's demise began with corporate consolidation in media9
ownership and crystallized with the commoditization of news as entertainment.
This commoditization arguably resulted in the descent of network news into
commercialized infotainment, sensationalized and celebrity reporting and mere
recitations of political sound bites rather than exhortations of critical substance.

4.

GIL SCOTT-HERON, "The Revolution Will Not Be Televised," on THE REVOLUTION WILL NOT

BE TELEVISED (RCA Music Group 1988).
5.

PETER DAHLGREN, TELEVISION AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE 40 (1995).

6.

See Now that Walter Cronkite Has Passedon, Who is America's Most Trusted Newscaster?,

TIME POLL RESULTS ,http://www.timepolls.com/hppolls/archive/

poll results_417.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2011); see also Jason Linkins, Online Poll: Jon Stewart Is
America's
Most
Trusted
Newsman,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Apr.
22,
2009),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/07/22/time-magazine-poll-jon-st-n-242933 .html.
7. Linkins, supranote 6.
8. See Roderick Spencer, Fake News Is the Real News, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 30, 2009),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/roderick-spencer/fake-news-is-the-real-new-b_305799.html.
9. ANDERSON, supra note 1, at x, xi, xvi; BAYM, supranote 1, at 3, 14.
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Some feel that the primary purpose of producing broadcast journalism has become
the promotion of consumption rather than civic engagement.10 As a result, some
journalism and first amendment reformists champion returning to the Golden Age
of journalism, an age when political news was clearly separated from
entertainment, and when professional journalists,
like anchorman Walter Cronkite,
11
civically informed and guided Americans.
This Article contends, however, that the challenge facing broadcast journalism
in engaging the American public long precedes the corporate consolidation of the
industry and is not rooted per se in the intersection of civic news with
entertainment.
Instead, broadcast journalism's deliberative peril lies in its
continued adaptation of long held and erroneous mainstream societal norms, which
required that reason be separated from emotions and pleasure, and presumed that
public and civic knowledge and participation be disengaged from popular culture
and discourse. This Article revisits the equal time rule and the bona fide newscast
and news exemptions to show that these presumptive hegemonic norms were
further solidified and reinforced by media law and policy, namely via the creation
and early interpretation of these exemptions.12 When triggered, absent application
of any of the bona fide news exemptions, the equal time rule requires broadcast
owners to provide equal access time on a particular program to opposing political
candidates if access on such program had been granted to any other candidate
running for the same office. 13 This Article focuses primarily on the bona fide
newscast and news interview exemptions of the equal time rule and posits that their
early interpretations illuminate the law's solidification of such norms. 14 These
norms dictated that in order to engage deliberatively, rationalism had to rise above
and contain both commercial and private self-interest-and could in fact do so via
an ethical code of professionalism. 15
Specifically, with the creation of traditional network news programming and
formats as personified by the televisual images of journalists Edward Murrow and
Walter Cronkite, such presumptive norms were grafted into the political public
sphere and had the effect of narrowly defining civic participatory discourse and
public engagement. 16 Indeed, public discourse and the distribution of political
10. ANDERSON, supra note 1, at x, xi, xvi; BAYM, supra note 1, at 3, 14.
11.
ANDERSON, supra note 1, at 20.
12. See infra Part I.C.
13. Equal Time Amendment to Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 86-274, 73 Stat. 557
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (2006)).
14. There are two additional exemptions from the equal time rule-namely, bona fide news
documentaries and on-the-spot coverage of a bona fide news event. Anne Kramer Ricchiuto, The End of
Time for Equal Time?: Revealing the Statutory Myth of Fair Election Coverage, 38 IND. L. REV. 267,
267-68 (2005). This latter exemption has been interpreted to include coverage of political debates and
press conferences. See generally Chisholm v. FCC, 538 F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
15.
ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY & JOHN NICHOLS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF AMERICAN
JOURNALISM: THE MEDIA REVOLUTION THAT WILL BEGIN THE WORLD AGAIN 140 (2010).
16. BAYM, supra note 1, at 170. Unless defined otherwise herein, references to "traditional
news," "network news," "network journalism" or "broadcast journalism" refer to traditional newscast
formats, style and norms developed and provided by the commercial television broadcast networks and
not to local news programming or to public broadcasting.
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news largely became the domain of the professionals in the 1940s when the
broadcast networks (ABC, NBC and CBS) arguably adopted print journalism's
professional code of responsible journalism, which required impartiality,
objectivity and rationalism. 17 Professionalism and rationality in turn required
professionals to bracket and contain all private self-interests or experiences that, if
left unchecked, undermined the objective political discourse.18 The net result of
such bracketing was a rational, aesthetically sterile political culture and discourse
that was construed primarily as white and male.19 Concerns and issues of other
groups, including those of minorities, were marginalized during what some have
ironically characterized as the Golden Age of Journalism. 20
Broadcast journalists were soon positioned as the gatekeepers of what was
construed and accepted as political news. 21 Through the uniform provision of
network news programming, the networks imposed a unitary language on, and
format for, the provision of political news. 22 Aesthetically pleasing presentation
styles and formats were sacrificed in the process. Indeed, broadcast owners
positioned network news as the polar opposite to entertainment programming. 23 It
was deemed as fostering the higher and nobler goals of deliberative discourse while
entertainment programming was devalued as problematic to deliberation in that its
primary purpose was to appeal to the emotions of viewers as consumers. 24 This
Article posits that early interpretations of the bona fide newscast and news
interview exemptions helped to solidify network news' hegemony over who could
construct, and what would be construed as, political news. 25 Indeed, for the first
three decades following their enactment, the bona fide newscast and news interview
exemptions were only applied to candidate appearances on network news
programming and to traditional network news inspired
public affairs programming,
26
such as "Meet the Press" and "Face the Nation."
17.

JACK FULLER, WHAT IS HAPPENING TO NEWS:

THE INFORMATION EXPLOSION AND THE

CRISIS IN JOURNALISM 12-15 (2010). Unless otherwise defined herein, "political news" as used
throughout this Article is best defined by Robert McChesney in his recent book:
[N]ews is what you and I need to keep our freedom-accurate and timely information on [but not
limited to] laws and wars, police and politicians, taxes and toxics. Freedom is about a lot more
than being able to pick your hairstyle or decide what color shirt to wear. Freedom in the deeper
civic sense involves controlling one's life, one's social environment, one's future, in
collaboration with other members of the community . . . .Freedom [also] requires that the
choices be made in a democratic fashion.
MCCHESNEY & NICHOLS, supra note 15, at 164 (internal quotations omitted).
18. BAYM, supranote 1,at11;FULLER, supra note 17, at12-15.
19. BAYM, supra note 1,at49.
20. MCCHESNEY & NICHOLS, supranote 15, at50-51.
21. BAYM, supranote 1,at49.
22. Id. at 12.
23. Id.
at11.
24. Id.
25. See infra Part I.C.
26. Michael Damien Holcomb, Comment, Congressional Intent Rebuffed:
The Federal
Communications Commission's New Perspective on 47 US.C. § 315(a)(2), 34 Sw. U. L. REV. 87, 93
(2004); see also Jonathon D. Janow, Note, Make Time for Equal Time: Can the Equal Time Rule
Survive a Jon Stewart Media Landscape?, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1073, 1079 (2008).
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In applying bona fide news exemptions in this way, this Article contends that the
Federal Communication Commission ("FCC") embraced conventional norms
steeped in modernistic logic, which placed a premium on the reason and rationality
typified by traditional news formats and personified by professional broadcast
journalists.27 Indeed, early FCC guidance exempted candidate appearances on
such network news programming from equal time requirements-arguably because
of the rationalism and objectivity these shows presumptively embodied given the
format and the presence of the professional journalist or expert. Candidate
appearances on most entertainment programs, however, did trigger the equal time
requirement. 28 This legal reification of professionalism and the professional
journalists also problematically fostered what some have coined as a thin
citizenship where citizens were stripped of their own agency, and construed as
needing to receive political cues from such professionals on civic discourse and
engagement. 29 As other media and programming options became available through
cable, viewers began to "tune out" from broadcast journalism, eventually becoming
disinclined to follow along paternalistically as the recipients of broadcast
journalism's cues. 30 They preferred instead to proactively engage as cocreators in
the dissemination, construction and negotiation of political discourse, as arguably
evidenced by the widely popular appeal of, and participatory engagement on,
entertaining day time talk shows, like "Donahue." 31 Interestingly, most legal
scholarship exploring these bona fide news exemptions laments the FCC's rulings,
beginning in the 1980s, which extended the exemptions beyond traditional news
formats to such entertainment programs, commonly referred to as tabloid
journalism. 32 Such extensions are deemed as primary contributing factors to the
trivialization and 33commercialization of the political news necessary for a selfgoverning public.
This Article contends, however, that by initially extending these bona fide news
exemptions to shows generally classified as entertainment, such as "Donahue,"
these rulings, in theory, also challenged the long held and erroneous conventions in
network journalism that bifurcated traditional news formats from entertaining ones.
With such a new beginning, these rulings shifted the paradigm and had the capacity
of broadening the topics, the arena and format of deliberation in the public sphere.
They also drew in participants who might not have otherwise been engaged due to

27. The FCC replaced the Federal Radio Commission pursuant to the Communications Act of
1934 as the administrative body charged with regulating the nation's telecommunication and
communication systems. See Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 1, 48 Stat. 1064, 1064 (1934)
(current version at 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2006)); see also infra Part I.C.
28. Holcomb, supra note 26, at 88, 100.
29. BAYM, supranote 1, at 170.
30. See generally Holcomb, supra note 26.
31. DAHLGREN, supra note 5, at 27; JEFFREY P. JONES, ENTERTAINING POLITICS: SATIRIC
TELEVISION AND POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT 149, 158, 181 (2d ed. 2010).
32. See generallyJanow, supra note 26, at 1085.
33. See generally Holcomb, supra note 26; Henrik Omebring & Anna Maria Jonsson, Tabloid
Journalism and the Public Sphere: A Historical Perspective on Tabloid Journalism, 5 JOURNALISM
STUD. 283 (2004).
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lack of interest or to marginalization in the mainstream political discourse. This
theoretical development was short lived in practice, however, as massive media
consolidation made possible by the repeal of limits placed on media ownership and
other FCC deregulatory efforts blurred traditional news and entertainment
further. 34 Such blurring was not for the purpose of facilitating a wider
participatory discourse, but rather was aimed to, and had the effect of,
as "infotainment" to maximize profits for new
commoditizing political news 35
corporate conglomerate owners.
Within this conglomerated context and shift in broadcaster vision, the FCC gives
deference in its current application of the bona fide newscast and news interview
exemptions to broadcaster judgment. 36 But today, in spite of being cloaked in
normative traditional news formats, broadcasters are focused on retaining viewers
via sensationalized reports, celebrity coverage and by providing mere sound bites
rather than "real" political news of substance. 37 This Article contends that,
although the FCC aptly continues to retreat in its interpretation of the bona fide
newscast and news interview exemption from the presumption that entertainment
programming on the whole has little, if any, deliberative value, the FCC
nevertheless continues to preserve presumptions that traditional news programming
is itself inherently valuable as a deliberative tool. 38 Indeed, this Article posits that
the FCC presumes such programming still engages citizens simply because it is
information provided pursuant to a claimed journalistic/editorial judgment, and
within a traditional network news format.
This Article explores the law's continued assumption of such news's
deliberative value and its failure to acknowledge (or rather, to delineate as it has in
entertainment programming contexts) that network news, like some music and other
entertainment content, can also be purely entertaining and may contribute little, if
any, value in informing and engaging the deliberating public with the political news
necessary to sustain a self-governing democracy. 39 This Article also challenges
media reformists' advocacy for return to a regulatory paradigm that will bring back
traditional news formats, style, and programming typified by the Golden Era. To
regain and broaden broadcast journalism's deliberative legitimacy and function,
such calls for reform must recognize and yield to the power of television and not
return to the top down, humdrum, deadpan and sterile format that epitomized the
Golden Age of Journalism. To do so would erroneously overlook the extent to
which political news, when presented in a manner that is both entertaining or
aesthetically and popularly appealing (for example, on Comedy Central's
ANDERSON, supra note 1, at 21-22; MCCHESNEY & NICHOLS, supra note 15, at 40.
35. ANDERSON, supranote 1, at x, xi, xvi, 7; BAYM, supra note 1, at 5.
36. Holcomb, supra note 26, at 94.
37. See infra Part II.B. 1.
38. Id.
39. See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (acknowledging political value of
politically motivated satire, despite its appearance in a medium of pop culture, namely Hustler
magazine). See generally Akilah Folami, From Habermas to Get Rich or Die Tryin: Hip Hop, the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, and the Black Public Sphere, 12 MicH. J. RACE & L. 235 (2007)
(discussing value of music, specifically hip hop, to deliberative discourse).
34.
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"Politically Incorrect" or "The Daily Show"), attains legitimacy as a political news
source for deliberative purposes.
Moreover, this Article contends that precisely because Americans are tuning
into entertaining sitcoms, tabloid talk shows, escapist soap operas, sensational
reality TV, sound-bite news pundits and satirical and comedic late night talk shows,
those who value and advocate for a wider, authentic, critical and participatory
democracy must consider the potential of entertaining and sensational television in
drawing audiences into the deliberating discourse. Television continues to grab,
hold and deliver the much sought after prize, by politician and advertiser alike-the
attention of the viewing and voting consumer/citizen-in the hyper-mediated,
information age of the twenty-first century, be it by content provided via broadcast
or cable/satellite television or via recalibration on the Internet. Challenges must
continue to be mounted against the current hyper-commercialized and
sensationalized spectacle that predominates broadcast and cable news
programming, and is devoid of political news necessary for sustaining selfgovernance. Calls to revive, rescue and reshape a sustainable journalism that
investigates, informs and engages the public with the necessary political news must
still be televised nonetheless-and televised in a manner that capitalizes on
television's popular mass and entertaining appeal. Reform movements must
account for the media saturated public sphere and the multidimensional and
intersecting ways in which people are not only informed, but also civically engaged
and participatory.
Part I of this Article highlights the early American history of participatory
infrastructure and the values attached thereto. Part I also exposes many of the
contradictions inherent in both the adoption and adaptation of a professional
journalism code that elevated, for deliberative purposes, network news over most
content construed as entertaining, and thus fostered what some have termed thin
citizenship.4 ° Part II highlights the current trend of politicized entertainment
programming in enhancing political news and discourse, in contrast to the
commercialization and deliberative stagnation of mainstream traditional news
sources. Finally, Part III is motivated by scholar Cass Sunstein's work urging first
amendment media scholars and activists to move beyond the two juxtaposing
frames-regulatory public interest and laissez-faire market incentive-that have
driven broadcast regulation and policy since its inception, and to explore open
ended and creative approaches 4to1 remedying the current crisis in broadcast
journalism's deliberative function.
This final section suggests a modest remedy: the adoption of a slightly modified
"pay and compete" model that factors in the equal time rule as it relates specifically
to enhancing the provision of political news via candidate appearances on broadcast
television. The pay and compete model would require broadcasters to pay a fee to
a public entity for continued licensure of the broadcast spectrum, but also would
grant them the opportunity to compete with other broadcasters to earn back the fee
40.
41.

BAYM, supra note 1, at 170.
Cass R. Sunstein, Television and the Public Interest,88 CAL. L. REv. 499, 505 (2000).
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by creating quality content that satisfies predetermined standards. This model
blends both traditional regulatory and market based media policies, is less intrusive
than traditional FCC regulation and resolves some of the market inefficiencies that
have historically
rendered political news vulnerable to underproduction and lacking
42
in substance.
I. DELIBERATING INFRASTRUCTURE: FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE
American history reveals the early nation's firm commitment to the ideals of
fostering an open, participatory and civically informed citizenry. Even before
enactment of the First Amendment's pronouncement that "Congress shall make no
law.., abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press," newspapers were already
in print and circulation. 43 Indeed, "[w]hen the First Amendment was adopted and
for many years thereafter, anybody with anything to say had comparatively little
difficulty in getting it published: presses were cheap; the journeyman printer could
become a publisher and editor by borrowing the few dollars he needed to set up his
shop." 44 In addition, although the press operated without the benefit of major first
amendment protections until the beginning of the twentieth century, the
marketplace of ideas, both partisan and independent, was overflowing, open and
45
accessible.
An open and accessible free press was generally understood as indispensable
and necessary to popular sovereignty. 46 Thomas Jefferson, in his famous letter to
Edward Carrington in 1787, emphatically claimed that "were it left to me to decide
whether we should have a government without newspapers, or newspapers without
a government, I should not hesitate a moment to prefer the latter." 47 Over 150
years later, Justice Hugo Black echoed Jefferson's sentiment in Associated Press v.
United States, noting that it was the grave concern for sustaining a free press that
prompted the very adoption of the First Amendment. 48 However, because the First
Amendment's freedom of the press and freedom of speech provisions are not
elaborated upon within the Constitution, long standing debates have resulted over
whether the "freedom of the press" language provides privileges separate from,

42. Id. at 516-17 (discussing the underproduction of political news, the overproduction of fear
based content and broadcasters' imitation of other broadcasters' programming to attract consumers).
43. U.S. CONST., amend. I; LEE C. BOLLINGER, UNINHIBITED, ROBUST, AND WIDE-OPEN: A
FREE PRESS FOR A NEW CENTURY 56 (2010).

44.

BOLLINGER, supra note 43 (internal citation omitted).

45.
ROBERT W.T. MARTIN, THE FREE AND OPEN PRESS: THE FOUNDING OF AMERICAN
DEMOCRATIC PRESS LIBERTY, 1640-1800, at 4-5 (2001); MCCHESNEY & NICHOLS, supra note 15, at

135 ("Nearly all viewpoints would get a fair hearing in the marketplace ... and if the existing range of
viewpoints was insufficient new newspapers could be launched.").

46.

MCCHESNEY &NICHOLS, supra note 15, at 118-19.

47. ERIC LANE & MICHAEL ORESKES, THE GENIUS OF AMERICA: HOW THE CONSTITUTION
SAVED OUR COUNTRY AND WHY IT CAN AGAIN 93 (2007)
48.
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) (noting that the First Amendment
"rests on the assumption that. .. a free press is a condition of a free society").
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49
and/or in addition to, those imparted as "freedom of speech.",
Historically, some scholars have read the freedom of the press clause as creating
an institutional press that was granted a unique status with rights "distinct from
individuals exercising free speech rights, and ... from other commercial
enterprises." 50 It is clear, however, that to the extent that specialized rights were
granted to the press, they were granted to the press in its capacity as a watchdog for
abuses of power and as an informational tool for the deliberating public who, in
turn, held leaders accountable through votes. 51 Any reading of the First
Amendment's freedom of the press provision as protecting an institutional press or
profession must be grounded then in the premise that such protections are based on
the institutional press being imbued "with a public purpose, a systemic function as
of government .... The
vital to American democracy as the three official branches
52

relevant metaphor ...is that of the Fourth Estate."

While not mutually exclusive, an equally strong and legally sound interpretation
of the First Amendment's freedom of the press provision is one that regards it as "a
structural provision of the Constitution." 53 One of its central goals in this paradigm
is "the creation of a system of deliberative democracy," intended not only for
54
printers and their private gain but also for the fostering of civic knowledge.
Indeed, such a system of deliberative democracy was envisioned to provide
participatory protections not only for the institutional press but also for all
citizens. 55 Moreover, it was deemed necessary for the "maintenance of our
political system and an open society," and for the "solicitude not only for
communication itself, but also for the indispensable conditions of meaningful

49. BOLLINGER, supra note 43, at 8-9. The main body of the Constitution itself contained no
direct reference to freedom of speech or the press. LANE & ORESKES, supra note 47, at 93. Rather, the
Bill of Rights was at least partially a product of the Framers' need "[t]o win votes for ratification ...[by
offering] to support something they had originally thought was unnecessary: a bill of rights." Id.
50.

MCCHESNEY & NICHOLS, supra note 15, at 149.

51. Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 28-29 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). The press, as well as the
public, was not, however, always consistently granted full freedom to criticize the government in order
to hold them accountable. Within eight years of ratification of the Bill of Rights, the government passed
"a piece of legislation, a blight on American constitutional history, known as the Sedition Act." LANE &
ORESKES, supra note 47, at 108. The Act "ineffect criminalized criticism of the president and Congress
.. .[and specifically targeted] the press." Id. at 110. The Act expired before any challenge to its
constitutionality could be mounted in court. Id. at 114-115. Justice Brennan stated later that
"[a]lthough the Sedition Act was never tested in this Court, the attack upon its validity has carried the
day in the court of history." N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964).
52. BOLLINGER, supra note 43, at 9; see also Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Nobody's Fools: The
Rational Audience as First Amendment Ideal, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 799, 848-49 (arguing that when
operating as a fully functional Fourth Estate, the press's role is to illuminate the public and indeed guide
and inform public discourse).
Potter Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 633 (1975).
53.
54.
Cass R. Sunstein, Statement ofCass R. Sunstein, in CHARTING THE DIGITAL BROADCASTING
FUTURE: FINAL REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC INTEREST OBLIGATIONS OF DIGITAL
available
at
BROADCASTERS
94,
97
(1998),
TELEVISION
[hereinafter ADVISORY COMMITTEE]
(emphasis
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/piac/piacreport.pdf
added); see also MCCHESNEY & NICHOLS, supranote 15, at 115.
55.
See Sunstein, supra note 4 1, at 524.
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communication." 56 American press historian Robert Martin confirms this
interpretation by establishing that the free press and open press doctrines of the
First Amendment coexisted in America's history, with the former referring to the
institutional press defending the public liberty against abuses of power and the
to the individual right of every person to air his or her views for all
latter referring
57
to consider.
Early government policies reveal a desire to sustain an inclusive participatory
press infrastructure even at a time when private market interests showed little
Indeed, government subsidies were instrumental to
interest in doing so. 58
developing an institutional press, which included both independent and highly
partisan papers published by political parties. 59 Such incentives were definitional
in maintaining the structure of the developing industry, and exemplified
"enlightened democratic policymaking, because it offered the same benefits to all
newspapers regardless of their viewpoint." 60 American public policy also favored
a communication infrastructure that aimed to inform and engage a broader
participatory public. 61 From the outset, "[p]ublic policy... focused explicitly on
getting the news to a wide readership, and chose to support news outlets by taking
on costs of delivery [via postal subsidies] and, through printers' exchanges, of
production [via printing subsidies]." 6 2 Thomas Jefferson, as the nation's second
Secretary of State, fully endorsed such government subsides because he saw a press
free to investigate and criticize the government as essential for a nation practicing
self-governance. 63
Furthermore, to foster a more meaningful engagement of American citizenry,
Jefferson also advocated for public education and libraries because "for [him],
56. Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 588 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(emphasis added); Time Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967).
57. MARTIN, supra note 45, at 4-5.
58.
MCCHESNEY & NICHOLS, supra note 15, at 128.
59. Id.at 133. McChesney and Nichols point out that journalism historians find it difficult to
reconcile that the "same enlightened geniuses who crafted the First Amendment also created a partisan
press system subsidized by political parties and government contracts, not to mention postal giveaways."
Id.at 129. Moreover, they stress that the key-then and now-to maintaining a participatory democracy
with a partisan press system is, however, that "multiple competing well-funded media." Id. Finally,
they note that media owners, who traditionally and systematically raise laissez-faire market based
arguments against any govemment involvement in media, often neglect to mention this particular history
of govemment intervention via the favorable economic structural regulations that benefited their
industry. Id.at 143. Some benefits are currently still in place, including those, for example, that
exclude broadcaster advertising revenue from state sales taxes and allow them to be treated as a
legitimate deductible business expense from a business' taxable income. Id.
60. Id. at 126.
61.

DAVID M. HENKIN, THE POSTAL AGE: THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN COMMUNICATIONS IN

NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 42 (2006) (noting that the post office was significant in the lives of
Americans in the eighteenth to the nineteenth century as it was the primary means of mass
communication).
62. MCCHESNEY & NICHOLS, supra note 15, at 126. In addition, while the developing nation
borrowed many of its laws and policies from Britain, American policy chose not to replicate its taxation
on American editors and publishers thereby making it easier for them than for their British counterparts
to start and maintain papers. Id. at 132.
63. Id. at 120-21.
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having the right to speak without government censorship is a necessary but
insufficient condition for a free press, and therefore democracy. It also demands
that there be a literate public, a viable press system, and that people have easy
access to this press." 64 As a result, public information and the press were viewed
as "the light of publicity" which lay at "the heart of democracy" and exposed, via
political news and public information, those in positions of power who violated the
public trust. 65 To Jeremy Bentham, such publicity was a prerequisite for the
creation of an enlightened public judgment. 66 For John Stuart Mill, the light of
publicity exposed and subjected government action to the will of the governed.67
68
Immanuel Kant thought that publicity engaged citizens in public discourse.
These sentiments regarding the press's role and function in a deliberating
democracy are theoretically similar to those of German philosopher Jurgen
Habermas on his theorized "public sphere." 69 Indeed, with regard to western
deliberative democratic history, Habermas has acknowledged that the press was the
primary agent of publicity. 70
Habermas's vision of the public sphere was introduced in his seminal book,
Structural Transformations of the Public Sphere, where he examined the rise and
decline in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries of the bourgeois public
sphere in Europe. 7 1 For Habermas, the bourgeois public sphere (like the press
infrastructure envisioned by Jefferson and others) was a domain where private
individuals gathered and disseminated information to educate and cultivate a
collective public voice positioned to hold those in power accountable. 72 The public
sphere was not premised on a specific physical space per se, but was envisioned
more as a "domain of social life in which such a thing as public opinion could be

64. Id. at 119.
65. BAYM, supra note 1, at 43-45; see also Maurice E. Stucke & Allen P. Grunes, Toward a
Better Competition Policyfor the Media: The Challenge of Developing Antitrust Policies that Support
the Media Sector's Unique Role in Our Democracy, 42 CONN. L. REV. 101, 105 (2009) ("A competitive
'marketplace of ideas' . . . is based on the theory that truth prevails in the widest possible dissemination
of information from diverse and antagonistic sources.").
66. Slavko Splichal, The Principle of Publicity, Public Use of Reason and Social Control, 24
MEDIA, CULTURE, AND SOC'Y 11-12 (2002).

67.

Bruce Baum, Freedom, Power and Public Opinion: J.S. Mill on the Public Sphere, 22

HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT 501 (2001).
68.
Simone Chambers, A Culture of Publicity, in DELIBERATION, DEMOCRACY, AND THE MEDIA

193 (Simone Chambers & Anne Costain eds., 2000); see also Splichal, supra note 66, at 14-15.
69. BAYM, supranote 1, at 44.
70. Id. Habermas, however, would more than likely stop far short of recognizing the press as a
public sphere in its own right given his allegiance to reasoned debate as the only effective means of
holding authority accountable. See Rosemary J. Coombe & Jonathan Cohen, The Law and Late Modern
Culture: Reflections on Between Facts and Norms from the Perspective of Critical Culture Legal
Studies, 76 DENY. U. L. REV. 1029, 1043 (1999).
71.
Jurgen Habermas, Further Reflections on the Public Sphere, reprinted in HABERMAS AND
THE PUBLIC SPHERE 421, 422 (Craig Calhoun ed., 1999).
72. Ken Hirschkop, Justice and Drama: On Bakhtin as a Complement to Habermas, in AFTER
HABERMAS:

NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE PUBLIC SPHERE 49, 50 (Nick Crossley & John Michael

Roberts ed., 2004).
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formed. ' 7 3 In this theoretically egalitarian space, all had access with participants
bracketing differences, social inequalities and even private interests for the sake of
the common good, which was to be determined by consensus of the participants
and by reasoned, truthful and enlightened debate. 74 To Habermas's dismay, private
interests undermined those of the common good and cut short the maturation of his
theorized public sphere and the independence of public opinion. 75 As a result,
"public communication... [became] moderated by the demands of big business
76
and.., led to a regressive 'dumbing down' of the level of public debate."
Many scholars, enticed by Habermas's public sphere theory, have found his
historical reading and interpretation of the bourgeois public sphere problematic due
to the model's inherent ideological contradictions. 77
They contend that
Habermas's bourgeois model was anything but open and accessible to all with
private interests and inequalities of status bracketed. 78 In rereading eighteenthcentury European history, such theorists have revealed that the period's norms
excluded women, people of color and unpropertied men from the bourgeois public
sphere that Habermas idealizes. 79 By idealizing the bourgeois public sphere and its
definition of civic participation, Habermas fails to appreciate the true repressive
nature of this sphere, and incorrectly situated it as the public-ignoring the
existence of alternative nonbourgeois public groups and their alternate modes of
political expression and discourse. 80 Scholars have revealed that contemporaneous
with the "bourgeois public there arose a host of competing counter-publics,
including nationalist publics, popular peasant publics, elite woman's publics and
working class publics," which emerged as popular movements that resonated with
the same democratic fervor as the bourgeois
public sphere and manifested their
81
own distinctive cultures, norms and desires.

73. Maria Simone & Jan Fernback, Invisible Hands or Public Spheres? Theoretical Foundations
for U.S. BroadcastPolicy, 11 COMM. L. & POL'Y, 287, 291 (2006).
74. Nancy Fraser, Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually
Existing Democracy, in HABERMAS AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE, supra note 71, at 109, 113.

Habermas

called this process the ideal speech scenario in which participants, who started out with views based on
their individual experiences and self-interest, experienced a "self-revelation, whereby private needs are
brought to consciousness and adjudicated through rational dialogue ....Ideal speech must bracket off
potentially distorting material forces and inequities." Michael Gardiner, Wild Publics and Grotesque
Symposiums: Habermas and Bakhtin on Dialogue, Everyday Life and the Public Sphere, in AFTER
HABERMAS: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE PUBLIC SPHERE, supranote 72, at 28, 35.
75.
Geoff Eley, Nations, Publics and Political Cultures: Placing Habermas in the Nineteenth
Century,in HABERMAS AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE, supra note 71, at 289, 293.

76. John Michael Roberts & Nick Crossley, Introduction to AFTER HABERMAS:
NEW
PERSPECTIVES ON THE PUBLIC SPHERE, supra note 72, at 1, 6 ("[A]s the mass media began to establish
itself as a viable economic market . .. it was both hijacked for the purpose of selling goods, via
advertising, and became a considerable saleable commodity in its own right.").
77. See generally Fraser, supra note 74, at 109-42; Mary P. Ryan, Gender and Public Access:
Women's Politics in Nineteenth-Century America, reprinted in HABERMAS AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE,

supra note 71, at 259-88.
78. See Gardiner, supra note 74, at 29.
79. Fraser, supra note 74, at 109, 115-18.
80. Ryan, supra note 77, at 259, 284.
81.

Fraser, supra note 74, at 116.

2011]

FREEING THE PRESS FROM DISCRETION AND HEGEMONY IN NEWS

381

Nancy Fraser, for example, highlights the many ways in which Habermas's
bourgeois public sphere and its cultural elitism and hegemony were challenged by
what she calls "subaltern publics." 82 Such publics were parallel discursive arenas
where members of subordinate social groups invented and circulated counterdiscourses. 83 These counter-discourses formulated oppositional interpretations of
their identities, interests and needs, which in turn challenged the hegemony of the
mainstream dominant public sphere. 84 For Fraser and others, "[t]o maintain an
inclusive democracy ... citizens must enter the public sphere with all their
for a variety of
identities and roles intact, and public discourse must create spaces
85
positions."
social
and
resources,
epistemic
perspectives,
cultural
A.

CULTURAL HEGEMONY AND PROFESSIONAL JOURNALISM

Echoing the contradictions inherent in Habermas's idealized bourgeois public
sphere, mainstream America's early democratic history, including its early press
history, reveals a conspicuous exclusion and marginalization of the working and
lower classes, women, the nonpropertied and those deemed property. 86 Moreover,
the shift to an advertisement supported institutional press and the eventual adoption
and normalization of the press's professional journalism code exacerbated
The private commercial self-interests of
exclusion and marginalization. 87
publishers looking to increase advertising profits and the cultural elitism of the
growing middle and elite classes decimated the competitive local and regional
working class newspapers that often offered diverging and participatory discourses
in print. 88 This shift began in the mid to late nineteenth century when the press
became independently commercially viable and many government subsidies were
discontinued.89 While its commercial viability was due in part to increased popular
readership and subscription, it was primarily due, however, to the growth of the
which itself was a byproduct of the developing industrial
advertisement industry,
90
capitalist economy.
82. Id. at 109-42.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. BAYM, supranote 1, at 59 (internal citation omitted); see also Fraser, supra note 74, at 120.
86. See generally Fraser, supra note 74, at 118-20; Michael Schudson, Was There Ever a Public
Sphere? If So, When? Reflections on the American Case, in HABERMAS AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE,
supra note 71, at 147-63 (noting the initial civic exclusion and later inclusion of women and Blacks).
With regard specifically to Blacks in this country, Houston Baker, Jr. points out that given the
exclusionary practices against Blacks, Blacks were essentially deemed as the property of the bourgeoisie
class, strategically prevented from acquiring literacy and socially constructed as weak, submissive,
illiterate and devoid of the very intellect and reason necessary to participate civically. Houston A.
Baker, Jr., Critical Memory and the Black Public Sphere (1994), reprinted in THE BLACK PUBLIC
SPHERE: A PUBLIC CULTURE BOOK 5, 13 (The Black Public Sphere Collective eds., 1995).
87. MCCHESNEY & NICHOLS, supra note 15, at 135.
88. Id. at 138-39.
89. DAVID PAUL NORD, COMMUNITIES OF JOURNALISM: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN NEWSPAPERS
AND THEIR READERS 228 (Robert McChesney & John C. Neome eds., 2001).
90. WILLIAM J. THORN WITH MARY PAT PFEIL, NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION: MARKETING THE
NEWS 44-45 (1987); see also NORD, supra note 89, at 138.
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With increased demand for advertising space to market products and with low
barriers to enter the industry, daily newspaper publishing exploded. 91 Similar to
the rise of secreted commercial interests that undermined Habermas's theorized
public sphere and the discourse therein, 92 publishers downplayed the overt
partisanship that marked the earlier era of newspapers (in an effort to appeal to a
wider subscribing audience) while retaining instead covert associations with
political parties and factions. 93 The views in the marketplace of ideas were
theoretically plentiful; in practice, however, the de facto effect of newspaper
reliance on advertisement soon pruned abundant and competitive markets into
concentrated commercial ones. 94 Fewer and larger newspaper monopolies soon
developed, thereby increasing economic barriers of new newspapers to enter and
smaller ones to compete "as advertisers rationally flocked to the leading
newspaper(s) that could offer the best rates and the widest reach. '' 95 These larger
newspapers became part of the mainstream public sphere because they had "the
largest audiences and [were] generally considered most important by members...
of the political, economic and cultural elites." 96 They soon, however, drew
the ire
97
of their most ardent supporters, as did the publications of the penny press.
From inception, the penny press, also referred to as yellow journalism or the
tabloid press, was never deemed respectable journalism by the mainstream public
press or cultural elites. 98 It was disliked due to its open attempts to increase
readership and advertisement revenue through human interest news, everyday life
stories and coverage of "scandalous tales of sin, [and] the immoral antics of the
upper class." 99 A responsible press was expected to provide "reports and
comments on political happenings, and even more importantly, commercial
information such as shipping news [because] the audience was the property class,
not the working class." 00 A rereading of American history reveals that the tabloid
press served as a subaltern public that "managed to attract new publics, by speaking
to them about issues previously ignored [by the mainstream press]."''
Nevertheless, it was maligned by cultural elitists "for sensationalism and
emotionalism, for over-simplification of complex issues, for catering to the lowest
common denominator and sometimes for outright lies."'10 2 To the extent larger
newspapers began to adopt similar sensational reporting styles and stories in an
effort to increase advertising revenue and subscription base, they too became the

91.

MCCHESNEY & NICHOLS, supra note 15, at 133.

92. Craig Calhoun, Introductionto HABERMAS AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE, supra note 71, at 1, 3942; Schudson, supranote 86, at 143, 152.
93. MCCHESNEY & NICHOLS, supra note 15, at 133-34.
94. Id. at 135.
95. Id.
96. Omebring & Jonsson, supra note 33, at 283, 285.
97. Id. at 287.
98. Id. at 288.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 287 (noting that penny press often covered political happenings of the day).
102. Id.
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subject of elite and middle class contempt for abdicating public servant
obligations-at least as such obligations were defined by their culturally elitist
103
norms.
Moreover, these larger newspapers also faced strong criticism from the
progressive era inspired popular press, which, like yellow journalism, was another
example of a subaltern public and counter-discourse to the mainstream press. 104
Indeed, "'[t]oward the end of the century, the voices of Populism cried out against
the economically powerful few who seemed to be responsible for crushing the
many."' 10 5 Critics, including famed writer Upton Sinclair, railed against the
advertisement based press structure whose growing monopolistic nature threatened
to undermine the ideals of the free and open press advanced by early American
interpretations of the freedom of the press clause. 106 Indeed, certain populist
movements advocated for alternative press structures such as nonprofit or
municipally owned models and/or ad-less papers. 107 These reform arguments have
08
resurfaced today in light of the current concentration of the newspaper industry. 1
However, with the "voluntary" adoption of a professional code of journalism in the
early 1920s-due in part to threats of government regulation to open up access-10 9
the commercial press evaded such growing and pressing populist concerns.
Publishers skillfully reshaped and narrowed sentiments about freedom of the press
from concern regarding maintenance of an open and free communication
infrastructure to consternation regarding government encroachment upon themthe news gatherers and distributors. "10
Even while veiling commercial successes through advertising, they adopted a
code that on its face addressed the articulated concerns of a growing number of
culturally (and politically) middle class and elite supporters who rallied against the
mainstream press's adoption of elements of tabloid journalism."' l Specifically, the
publisher supported professional code for reporters and editors advanced the
"disciplines of accuracy, disinterestedness in reporting, independence from the
people and organizations reported upon or affected by the report, a mode of
presentation sometimes called objective or neutral, and the clear labeling of what is

103.

MCCHESNEY & NICHOLS, supra note 15, at 138.

104. See generally id. at 139; Fraser, supra note 74, at 109-42 (discussing counter discourses as
oppositional constructions of identity and interests which challenged the hegemony of mainstream
ideologies).
105. FULLER, supranote 17, at 13.
106. MCCHESNEY & NICHOLS, supra note 15, at 139.
107. Id.
108.
See VICTOR PICKARD, JOSH STEARNS & CRAIG AARON, SAVING THE NEWS: TOWARD A
NATIONAL JOURNALISM STRATEGY 1, 10-11 (2009).
109.
MCCHESNEY & NICHOLS, supra note 15, at 140; PAUL ALFRED PRATE, GODS WITHIN THE
MACHINE: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF NEWSPAPER EDITORS 1923-1993 (1995).
110. MCCHESNEY & NICHOLS, supra note 15, at 140.
111.
Id. Indeed, "[flor reporters and editors, professional journalism allowed them some autonomy
from direct commercial pressures as they went about their work; for publishers, professionalism made

their increasing market power and dependence upon advertising legitimate, and permitted them to
generate extraordinary rates of return for a century." Id.
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fact and what is opinion." 112 The issue was recast from a struggle for an open and
participatory press infrastructure, to one for maintaining political news's legitimacy
3
itself. 11
Political news was instead now determined by respectable (and rationally
objective) professional journalists rather than by trash sensationalist journalists, an
encroaching government or even the popular sentiments and desires of the
public. 114 It was a recasting that was itself a reflection of the historical moment in
which it arose. 1 5 This progressive era sentiment, itself an extension of the
historical era "generally referred to as modernity.., was marked by twin forces of
rationalization and professionalization-the dividing of social life into distinct
domains and the reliance on professional expertise to identify and solve problems
within those domains."116
Benefitting directly then from self imposed adoption of a professional code
reflecting modernity's ideals, publishers' commercial interests were secreted by
their "high-modem journalists [who] were assumed to be informational
professionals, value free experts committed to the ideals of an objective public
interest and the rational pursuit of social order." 117 Pursuant to such code, the
"distinctive and crowning claim of professional journalism was that a division
could be established between the owner/advertiser on the one hand and the
editor/reporter on the other hand." ' 1 8 Moreover, the process of becoming a
professional required an eradication of "petty passions and narrowed ambitions,"
which were both deemed flaws to reason.1 19 Similarly, the civically engaged
participant in Habermas's idealized public sphere was, like the professional
journalist, expected to disengage from commercial pressures and bracket private
self-interests to engage in reasoned debate and argument to objectively assess the
common good. 120 In Habermas's idealized public sphere, reasoned debate alone
21
was the method of communicating sentiments in a deliberating democracy.'
Similarly with professional journalism, rationality, reason and refinement were cast
as the polar opposite of the emotional (and hence the sensational), with the former
construed as satisfying the noble, public and democratic good and the latter

112.
113.

FULLER, supra note 17, at 12.
MCCHESNEY & NICHOLS, supra note 15, at 135.

114.

Id.

115. FULLER, supra note 17, at 12-15. Publishers and their
professional code both reflected and
benefitted from a citizenry coming out of the travesties of the American Civil War who found "the
values of professionalism and expertise ... attractive [because] they implied impersonality, respect for
institutions as effective organizers of enterprise .. .[and the] . . . antidote to the human passions and
fighting faiths that recently, as throughout history, had produced unutterable horror." Id. at 13.
116. BAYM, supranote 1,at 11.
117. Id. at 11-12.
118. MCCHESNEY & NICHOLS,supra note 15, at 140.
119. FULLER, supra note 17, at 14. Indeed, implicit in the allegiance to reason is a distrust
of
emotions, as made clear by Justice Pound that"[i]nplace of reason we have subconscious wishes,
repressed desires, rooted behavior tendencies, habitual predispositions." Roscoe Pound, The Cult of the
Irrational, WELLESLEY ALUMNAE MAG., Aug. 1929, at 368, quoted in MICHAEL SCHUDSON,
DISCOVERING THE NEWS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN NEWSPAPERS 126 (1978).
120. Gardiner, supra note 74, at 35.
121.
Habermas, supra note 71, at 423.
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1 22
satisfying private, selfish and individualistic interests.
Although the commercial pressures from an advertisement subsidized printing
press and an exacting professional code continually clashed and eventually
imploded-as shown by the current economic crisis in print journalism-at the
time, the adoption of the code veiled publisher private interests and staved off
government interference in the news business. 123 Moreover, presumptive norms
that developed from such code's implementation positioned reporters and editors as
the proper arbiters for determining newsworthiness and standards for political
news's distributional style, format and content. 124 Arguably, the code also
assumed that professional and editorial journalistic judgments could be neutrally
authoritative and without commercial (or political) influence in determining what
constituted democratically valuable information. 125 The assumptions underlying
these norms all came to the fore with the development and regulation of broadcast,
of network news
the viewing preferences of the entertained, the commercialization
126
and the politicization of entertainment programming.

B.

BROADCAST'S DELIBERATIVE GOALS: EARLY REGULATORY COMPROMISES,
EQUAL TIME AND ACCESS AND BONA FIDE NEWS

While of negligible interest to the government for regulatory purposes in the
early stages of broadcast development, by the 1920s, radio had massive appeal and
was in such high demand that the government was summoned by citizens and
businesses alike to regulate the chaos and cacophony on the air caused by signal
interference and programming overlap. 127 In regulating broadcasting, Secretary of
Commerce Herbert Hoover declared early on that "[t]he ether is a public medium,
and its use must be for a public benefit.... The dominant element for consideration
' 128
in the radio field is, and always will be, the great body of the listening public."
As authorized by the Radio Act of 1912, legislation enacted due to widespread
public appeals for government intervention, Hoover distributed broadcast radio
licenses to citizens on a first come first serve basis at a time when spectrum
availability met demand. 129 Without a legal framework for distributing such
noise
licenses, however, the airwaves became cluttered, resulting in indecipherable
130
that threatened the industry's development as a communication medium.
122. Ornebring & Jonsson, supranote 33, at 284.
123. MCCHESNEY &NICHOLS, supranote 15, at 44.
124. Id.
125. FULLER, supra note 17, at 12 (elaborating on the developmental principles of the Standard
Model of Professional Journalism).
126. See NORD, supra note 89, at 10-11 (discussing a revitalized civic journalism as a possible
recourse for the journalism industry's rampant commercialization).
127. Akilah N. Folami, Deliberative Democracy on the Air: Reinvigorate Localism-Resuscitate
Radio 's Subversive Past,63 FED. COMM. L.J. 141, 149-50 (2011).
128. Herbert Hoover, Proceedings of the Fourth National Radio Conference and
Recommendationsfor Regulationof Radio, Nov. 9-11, 1925, 1926 DEP'T OF CoMM. 7.
129. See Radio Act of 1912, Pub. L. No. 62-264, 37 Stat. 302 (repealed 1927); ADvISORY
COMMITTEE, supranote 54, at 18.
130. Mike Harrington, Note, A-B-C, See You Real Soon: BroadcastMedia Mergers and Ensuring
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In addition, as diverse groups vied for licensure, free speech rights became
entangled in the call for better regulation on the use and licensing of the finite
broadcast frequencies. 131 To protect their speech interests, members of the broader
public, including religious groups, labor activists and educators, rallied for a
common carrier regime for broadcast licensing.' 32
Under this regime,
broadcasters, including existing licensees, would have been required to allow
anyone to buy airtime on a nondiscriminatory basis. 133 In staunch opposition to
this common carrier model, existing broadcast licensees urged Congress to grant
them full free speech rights, including complete editorial control over the use of the
licensed spectrum. 134 Such control was deemed necessary to effectuate their
commercial interests in linking local individual stations to one centralized national
headquarter, an agenda in direct conflict with congressional goals to maintain local
access outlets for listeners within the broadcaster's community.' 3 5 In 1923,
broadcasters developed the National Association of Broadcasters and adopted a
code a few years later in hopes of self-correcting their chaotic industry and staving
off government imposed regulation as the newspaper industry did with adoption of
its own professional code around the same time. 136 Such self-imposed regulatory
efforts were abysmally unsuccessful, as individual
and commercial broadcasters
137
often continued to collide with each other on air.
With passage of the Radio Act of 1927, Congress attempted to address the
confusion on the air, and in doing so, also rejected broadcasters' efforts to receive
the degree of first amendment editorial rights granted to the press.' 38 Such
rejection was due to the broadcast industry's readily apparent commercial interests
in networking local radio stations.' 39 Arguably, rejection was also due in part to
the broadcast industry's failure to embrace and accept public trustee obligations, as
newspaper owners had done (at least facially), with adoption of a professional
journalism code that canonized public servant responsibilities in its requirement of
objective and impartial factual reporting of political news. 140 Indeed, although the

a "'Diversityof Voices", 38 B.C. L. REV. 497, 504 (1997).
131.

ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 54, at 18.

132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Folami, supra note 127, at 150-51 (discussing early congressional goals in distributing
broadcast licenses broadly and locally to effectuate diversity on air rather than ceding control over the
nation's airwaves in one central licensee).
136. Id; ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 54, at 46; MCCHESNEY & NICHOLS, supranote 15, at
140 ("In an era when concerns about monopoly power were common, the American Society of
Newspaper Editors was created and as its first act formally adopted a professional code for
journalism.").
137. Ricchiuto, supra note 14, at 267, 269.
138. Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, §§ 4, 11, 12, 44 Stat. 1163, 1167; ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra
note 54, at 19.
139. See generally Paul Cowling, An Earthy Enigma: The Role of Localism in the Political,
Culturaland Economic Dimensions of Media Ownership Regulation, 27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J.

257, 288 (2005).
140. See also MCCHESNEY & NICHOLS, supra note 15, at 140.
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1927 Act prohibited the imposition of any common carrier regulations on
broadcast, it included a requirement that effectively limited broadcasters' first
amendment editorial rights. 4l
Specifically, the Act required broadcasters to
provide access to, or content on, their licensed airwaves pursuant to the interest,
convenience and necessity of the public, as determined by the FCC. 142 The FCC
was also given broad discretion to define such obligations as time and
circumstances required.143 This Article contends that, in contrast to the press that
"volunteered" and professed to serve the public in a way that sustained political
discourse-even while veiling commercial and monopolistic private interests of
publishers-broadcasters were now arguably subject to continued regulatory
oversight pursuant to the public interest standard for failing to do the same. 144 In
exchange for a license to broadcast for free (an item of considerable commercial
value due to high public demand), broadcasters agreed to comply with the
government imposed public interest obligations that required them to act as public
trustees of broadcast for the benefit of the public. 145
The abridgement of broadcaster first amendment rights was also premised on
146
scarcity doctrine-the idea that the broadcast spectrum is a scarce resource.
Because spectrum is scarce, government intervention was deemed necessary not
only to ensure efficient use of a finite number of frequencies, but also to prevent
unchecked commercial and monopolistic ventures that threatened to undermine
America's deliberative infrastructure. 147 Indeed, despite the common carrier
compromise that would have granted the public direct access to the airwaves,
Congress included two common carrier-like provisions, namely the right to access
and the equal time rules, which effectively required broadcasters to fulfill a

141. ADVIsORY COMMITTEE, supra note 54, at 19.
142. Id.
143. Id. These changes were solidified with the passage of the Communications Act of 1934, ch.
652, § 1, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.) (installing effectively
the seven member FCC and replacing the Federal Radio Commission as the regulatory body).
Moreover, pursuant to such public interest obligations, the FCC also eventually required broadcasters to
air children's educational programming and public affairs programming. Id. at 28-30. The FCC also
interpreted such standards in a manner that prohibited broadcasters from airing obscene content and
content deemed indecent during certain times of the day. Anthony E. Varona, Changing Channels and
Bridging Divides: The Failure and Redemption of American Broadcast Television Regulation, 6 MINN.
J.L. SCI. & TECH. 1, 39-40 (2004).
144. See also Thomas Blaisdell Smith, Note, Reexamining the Reasonable Access and Equal Time
Provisions of the Federal Communications Act:

Can These Provisions Stand ifthe Fairness Doctrine

Falls?, 74 GEO. L.J. 1491, 1493 (1986) ("[T]he physical limitations of the broadcast spectrum justify
government supervision of programming content pursuant to the public interest convenience and
necessity standard to ensure that the public is not denied the views of those not privileged with licenses
and that the broadcast audience is expose to a diverse marketplace of ideas.").
145. Tracey Westen, Government Created Scarcity: Thinking About Broadcast Regulation and the
FirstAmendment, in DIGITAL BROADCASTING AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 47, 57 (Charles M. Firestone

& Amy Korzick Garmer eds., 1998).
146. See Red Lion v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
147.
Kristine Martens, Restoring Localism to Broadcast Communications, 14 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART
& ENT. L. & POL'Y 285, 291-92 (2004).
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deliberative role early on in exchange for free licensure.148 Drafted into the 1927
Act and affirmed in the Communications Act of 1934 at 47 U.S.C. §§ 315(a) and
312(a)(7), the right of access and equal time rules imposed affirmative obligations
on broadcasters to provide candidates seeking federal office the right to purchase
an
airtime, and to provide equal access to the airwaves for all candidates seeking 149
elective office once one candidate for that same office was granted access.
These two provisions were thought of as helping to invigorate and sustain political
life by providing citizens access to information about candidates running for
office. 150
Indeed, as an informational obligation on broadcasters, the inclusion of both
sections manifests congressional acknowledgement of the "political potentialities
of radio," and of an intent "to encourage full and unrestricted discussion of political
issues by legally qualified candidates.., over radio and [subsequently]
television."'151 Both sections manifest Congress' "early recognition of the pressing
need to provide the public with information regarding the functioning of the
political process and the qualifications of candidates."' 152 Moreover, they were
enacted early on at the inception of mass media to effectuate a deliberative
infrastructure that had as its goal enabling the "population to better compare the
positions and qualifications 53of alternative candidates, [and to make] ... more
informed voting decisions."1
Sections 315(a) and 312(a)(7) also evidence congressional concerns about a
perceived broadcaster threat to the deliberative infrastructure ideals valued in early
154
American press history, given broadcast's ability to influence the public.
Indeed, as expressed in Representative Johnson's statement in 1926:
The power of the press will not be comparable to that of broadcasting stations when
the industry is fully developed ....They can mold and crystallize sentiment as no
agency in the past has been able to do. If the strong arm of the law does not prevent
monopoly ownership and make discrimination by such stations illegal, American
thought and American politics will be largely at the mercy of those who operate these
stations. 155
Therefore, § 315(a) specifically provides that during an election season, when a
broadcaster permits a "legally qualified candidate for public office to use his
broadcast station, he shall afford equal opportunities to all other such candidates for
that office in the use of such broadcasting station." 156 The statute's legislative

148. Smith, supra note 144, at 1491.
149. 47 U.S.C. §§ 301-26 (2006); Smith, supra note 144, at 1491-92.
150. Smith, supranote 144, at 1498.
151.
S. REP. NO. 86-562, at 3 (1956); Smith, supranote 144, at 1497 (internal citation omitted).
152. Smith, supra note 144, at 1504 (discussing the writings of James Madison, author of the Bill
of Rights).
153. Id. at 1509.
154. 47 U.S.C. §§ 312, 315.
155. 67 CONG. REc. 5558 (1926).
156. Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, § 18, 44 Stat. 1162, 1170 (1927) (codified as amended at 47
U.S.C. § 315 (2006)).
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history makes clear that its purpose is to "require a broadcaster to treat equally all
candidates for a particular office ... once the broadcaster has made its facilities
available to any one candidate."' 157 Moreover, to ensure evenhandedness of
candidate access and exposure on mass media, candidate "uses" that triggered equal
time requirements were defined broadly to include "any positive appearance of a
candidate by voice or picture." 158 With the 1959 Amendment to the equal time
rule exempting bona fide news appearances, it became clear that the use
requirement was not intended to include appearances on network news
programming. 159 On the other hand, candidate appearances on entertainment
programming like children's shows, comedy shows and rebroadcasts of movies
160
featuring candidates did trigger, perhaps appropriately, equal time requirements.
Such shows were not seen as satisfying the factors for applying the bona fide news
exemptions, which required that the show be regularly scheduled, that the
broadcaster control the program, and that the broadcaster's decisions on format,
content and participants be based on newsworthiness
and not on an intention to
161
favor or harm an individual's candidacy.
As this Article asserts, however, these bona fide news exemptions and their
early interpretations and application reified existing network norms that positioned
the industry created broadcast journalist as gatekeeper of political news. Such
norms relegated political news to network news programming and bifurcated it
from entertainment programming-a separation that sought to juxtapose reason and
62
pleasure, with the former valued and the latter not, for deliberative purposes.'
Moreover, this split between the unprofitable, but civic network news, from the
profit based entertaining fare essentially replicated the bifurcation in the 1920s of
the press's professional journalism ethic from the publisher's commercial motives
63
to increase advertising revenues that were underlying the newspaper industry.1
Indeed, it readily became apparent through the mass medium of television that such
divisions came at the expense of fostering a more inclusive and participatory

157. Holcomb, supra note 26, at 88 (citing Paulsen v. FCC, 491 F.2d 887, 889 (9th Cir. 1974)).
158. Id. at 87; Codification of the Commission's Political Programming Policies, 9 FCC Rcd. 651,
651 (1994).
159. Smith, supranote 144, at 1498 (citing Paulsen, 491 F.2d 887).
160. Paulsen, 491 F.2d at 890 (finding equal time requirements triggered even by candidate's
appearance on entertainment programming); Adrien Weiss, 58 F.C.C.2d 342 (1976) (finding a
broadcasting of movies featuring presidential candidate Ronald Reagan would constitute a use); Walt
Disney Prods., Inc., 33 F.C.C.2d 297 (1972) (finding candidate appearance on Disney's children show,
"The Mouse Factory" was a use).
161.
Janow, supra note 26, at 1080.
162. BAYM, supra note 1, at 11, 40 (discussing how the network news format "sacrificed aesthetic
appeal in favor of indexical realism," and that "[i]n so doing so, it reinforced modemity's distinctions
between the political normative and the aesthetic-expressive: between news and entertainment, and
ultimately between politics and pleasure").
163. Id. at 11 (discussing the perception of network news as being for the primary purpose of
providing information to the public even if not profitable and divorced from the larger networks "profit
seeking strategies"); see ANDERSON, supra note 1, at 6 (discussing that initially broadcasters accepted
that the provision of news was unprofitable and often over budget in its production, but provided news
pursuant to their watchdog commitments).

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS

[34:3

64
citizenry in the mainstream political public sphere and discourse. 1

C. CREATING "NEWS," AND THIN CITIZENSHIP: "MEET THE PRESS" AS BONA
FIDE NEWS

In 1959, the FCC held in the Lar Daly decision that an incumbent's brief
appearances in a number of network news clips during election season-including
one showing him greeting a foreign president and another where he solicited
contributions for the March of Dimes-constituted a "use" that triggered equal time
requirements. 165 Congress moved swiftly that year to amend the equal time rule to
override such literal interpretation of the rule's use requirement. 166 The 1959
amendments exempted bona fide news documentaries, on the spot news coverage
of bona fide news events, bona fide newscasts and bona fide news interviews. 167
The purpose of the amendments was, among other things, to "restore the
understanding of the law that had prevailed previously."' 168 This understanding
related specifically to the presumed deliberative value of network news. The
legislative history also illuminates the drafters' concerns that these exemptions
might "offer a temptation as well as an opportunity for a broadcaster to push his
favorite candidate and to exclude others."' 16 9
These exemptions arguably
resurrected the concerns regarding broadcast's potential influence on the political
process which were at the heart of the equal time rule's initial inclusion in the 1927
70
Radio Act. 1
Additionally, the legislative history makes clear that Congress deemed such risk
to be outweighed by appearances "presented at the initiative of the station as part of
a routine news broadcast in the exercise of the station's judgment as to newsworthy
events," because "[no] one will question that the categories of programs
exempted... serve to enlighten the public."' 171
While appearances on
entertainment programming were presumed inherently suspect as an unsavory
molder or crystallizer of public democratic sentiment, most, if not all, candidate
appearances on the same broadcast owner's network news were accepted as
political news and in turn bona fide news. 172 The implication then was that the
appearances (and all content for that matter) that appeared thereupon were
164. Id. at 12 (providing that professional journalism norms "reduced the role of the citizens,
speaking at and for them but allowing them no role in the conversation except as the audience").
165. CBS, Inc. (Lar Daly), 18 Rad. Reg. (P & F) 238, reconsideration denied, 26 F.C.C. 715
(1959).
166. Smith, supranote 144, at 1498.
167. Equal Time Amendment to Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 86-274, 73 Stat. 557
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (2006)).
168. Branch v. FCC, 824 F.2d 37, 43 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (emphasis added).
169. S.REP. No. 86-562, at 14(1959).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 5, 10.
172. See Paulsen v. FCC, 491 F.2d 887, 890 (9th Cir. 1974); Holcomb, supra note 26, at 103 ("The
FCC ...acknowledg[ed] that the Congressional intent of the 1959 amendments was to give broadcasters
a 'greater degree of editorial discretion."' (citing S. REP. NO. 86-562, at 12 (1959)).
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presumed then to be newsworthy, trustworthy, political and of inherent civic and
democratic value to the viewing public. In addition, television reporters and editors
were also presumed to be worthy of viewer trust, objectively separated in principle
from political favoritism and the private commercial interests of their broadcast
the slavish self-interested consumption
owners, and even disentangled from
173
oriented desires of the viewing public.
For example, although the FCC was given exceptional deference in equal time
claims, Congress made clear with the 1959 amendments (which effectively
reversed the FCC's Lar Daly decision) that it sanctioned candidate appearances on
network journalism-a televisual adaptation of the professional journalism code of
the mainstream commercial press. 174 Specifically, with the creation of the first
news program on CBS in 1948, broadcast owners dug television out of the
perception as a commercialized threat to democracy and ironically erected it
instead, via network news divisions, as the arbiter of all that is newsworthy and
hence political. 175 Through the personification of the printing press's professional
code of journalism and the visual image of anchormen like Edward Murrow and
Walter Cronkite, television was finally welcomed as an arm of the metaphorical
Fourth Estate, and soon came to define it. 176 The networks' uniform construction
of political news was sustained not only by a regulatory framework that readily
accepted it as satisfaction of federally imposed public interest obligations, but also
stature as satisfaction of the bona fide news
by a legal elevation of it in deliberative
177
cast and news interview exemptions.
For nearly three decades following the enactment of these exemptions, they
were only applied to network news programming and to traditional news inspired
public affairs programs like "Meet the Press" and "Face the Nation," where
178
professional and political commentators often interviewed political candidates.
Although Congress did not specifically define exempted bona fide news programs,
it did provide "Meet the Press" and similar public affairs programming as
examples. 179 Such shows characteristically had professionals and experts, who
interviewed politicians on selected topics of interest, and as a result, presumably
informed the public. 180 Indeed, network news and such related public affairs
173. BAYM, supranote 1, at 11.
174. See Holcomb, supra note 26, at 91-92. The exemptions were generally granted with such
appearances, absent that is, clear evidence indicating a lack of good faith on the part of the broadcaster.
Smith, supra note 144, at 1498.
175. DAHLGREN, supra note 5, at 48, 62; JONES, supra note 31, at 149, 158, 182.
176. BAYM, supra note 1, at 9, 10, 30; JONES, supra note 31, at 158.
177. BAYM, supra note 1, at 11. As Baym writes:
[Flederal regulation was built on the principle of trusteeship ... the insistence that in order to
profit from the use of the public airwaves, broadcasters were obliged to act as trustees of the air
and serve the 'public interest, convenience, and necessity' .... [F]or many local television news,
that requirement was easily met by broadcasting the nightly network news.
Id.
178. Holcomb, supra note 26, at 93.
179. 105 CONG. REC. 17,779 (1959); Holcomb, supranote 26, at 93.
180. S. REP. No. 86-562, at 14 (1959) (indicating that the civic value of such information to the
public when provided as part of a news broadcast was a given).
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programs were presumed to provide the reasoned information necessary for a
healthy democratic culture, including information8 1 gleaned by journalists from
candidate appearances on network news programs.1
However, this construction of political news and, by extension, bona fide news
also perpetuated what some scholars have defined as a thin citizenship that limited
and defined who could participate, and how one could participate, in the political
public sphere and discourse. 182 Indeed, such norms "offered no role for the public
to play save that of passive audience, whose requirements for citizenship could be
fulfilled simply by watching TV. High modem news thus encouraged a kind of
thin citizenship, one.., that confirmed the public's psychological incompetence to
participate in the culture of democratic publicity." 183 As a result, public discourse
and the attainment and distribution of political news largely became the domain of
the professionals. Professionalism and rationality required a self-bracketing (or the
appearance of self-bracketing) of all private interests or experiences that, if left
unchecked, undermined the objective political discourse. 184 The net result after
such bracketing was a rational, democratic and political culture and discourse that
was construed as primarily white and male, a point also made by those critiquing
Habermas's idealized public sphere and its "deliberating peers."'18 5 Concerns and
issues of those that did not fit such characteristics, including those of minorities,
were marginalized during what some have ironically characterized as the Golden
Age of Journalism. 186 If not captured by the gatekeepers, the expressivity of such
marginalized groups, be it in social protests or other activities, was presumed to be
irrational, civically unruly and, indeed, antidemocratic. 187 With the advent of cable
and the public demand for more of a participatory role in shaping and processing
political news and political discourse, the norms and assumptions attached to the
Golden Age began to buckle, thereby foreshadowing the crisis broadcast journalism
now faces in deliberatively engaging the public.
II. EXPOSING THIN CITIZENSHIP
With less face to face exchange and with the increase of media based
negotiation, public sphere theorists now contend that the public sphere is a
mediated one, and that television and its content must be understood as a
181. BAYM, supranote 1, at 168 (noting that high-modem journalism was assumed to be providing
the citizen with factual information and reasoned interpretation of the political process); see also
Sunstein, supra note 41, at 510 (contrasting traditional network news with the current culture, where
there is "too little coverage of serious questions, especially during political campaigns," and noting that
"[t]he relevant coverage may involve sensationalism and 'sound bites,' or attention to who is ahead
('horse-race issues') rather than who thinks what and why").
182. BAYM, supra note 1, at 170.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 11 ("[H]igh modem journalists were assumed to be informational professionals, valuefree experts committed to the ideals of an objective public interest and the rational pursuit of social
order."); JONES, supra note 31, at 44.

185.
186.
187.

Fraser, supra note 74, at 115-17.
BAYM, supra note 1, at 49; MCCHESNEY & NICHOLS, supra note 15, at 50-51,
BAYM, supra note 1, at 49.
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sociocultural invention shaped by the political culture in which it exists. 188 For
well over four decades, until the mid-1980s, the big three networks (ABC, NBC
and CBS) dominated and defined television and broadcast journalism. 189 Through
the uniform provision of network news programming, the networks imposed a
unitary language of political news as defined by their broadcast journalists and, in
doing so, reinforced a psychological dependence in the viewer citizen on such
journalists for public and participatory cues regarding political importance and the
need for civic attention and engagement.190 There was little space or relevance in
the political discourse for entertainment, or for the whims and pleasures of the
entertained-the viewing public.
The networks then, like the newspaper
monopolies that arose out of an advertisement supported press system in early
American press history, seemed to become the mainstream political public sphere
in mass media form. Network news typified the bourgeois political public sphere,
and was likewise infused with culturally exclusionary and elitist norms.
A.

DAYTIME TALK SHOWS AS SUBALTERN PUBLIC SPHERE: "DONAHUE" AS
BONA FIDE NEWS

Broadcast's hegemony over political news, political discourse and the viewing
public began to unravel in the mid-1980s with cable's introduction of alternate
entertainment programming; subscribers were now no longer confined to network
news during prime time evening hours. 19 1 This shift signaled the beginning of the
end of network news's presumptive norms regarding broadcast journalists' elevated
status as gatekeepers of political news and discourse, of the bifurcation of political
news on network formats rather than entertaining ones and of the perpetuation of a
democratic culture that narrowly defined civic engagement of the viewing public as
passive followers. 192 As viewers began to exercise their own agency and to choose
188. DAHLGREN, supra note 5, at 40.
189. Sunstein, supra note 41, at 527 (noting that for over three decades television programming
was provided by the three large networks and later public broadcasting).
190. BAYM, supra note I, at 12 (discussing how the networks' presentation of the news during the
network age "imposed ... a 'unitary language' . . . a singular worldview that limited the range of

understandings about the nature of the political domain and the ways in which it could be represented.
Reproduced each day, this worldview was taken as the self-evident expression of common sense.");
JONES, supra note 31, at 43; James W. Carey, The Press, Public Opinion, and Public Discourse, in
PUBLIC OPINION AND THE COMMUNICATION OF CONSENT 390-91 (Theodore L. Glasser & Charles T.
Salmon eds., 1995) (arguing that modernity's social construction of political discourse confirmed the
public's perceived "psychological incompetence" to deliberatively engage in democratic culture).
191.
BAYM, supra note 1,at 15 (noting that with the advent of cable, media networks "lost the
tight control they used to have over where and when viewers watched particular programs").
192. JONES, supra note 31, at 6. The networks:
maintained an artificial separation between politics and popular culture, specifically assigning
public affairs programming to news divisions while entertainment... was managed by different
divisions ....Through forced segregation ...network executives construed politics in reductive
terms, primarily handled by experts, employing a grave and serious tone ....This separation
began to be erased, however with the advent of competition from cable and its challenge to the
network oligopoly inthe post-network era.
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from a motley of viewing options made possible by the advent of cable
programming that included twenty-four hour cable news and political pundit talk
shows, broadcast journalism was no longer perceived as the sole authority on
political news. 193
Moreover, cable's introduction and increase of entertainment programming
made unsustainable broadcaster insistence on relegating political news to a format
deliberately devoid of aesthetic or popular appeal and on premising continued
network news viewership on a thinly defined notion of a paternalistic
citizenship. 194 Many television viewers began to turn from network news to
cable's entertainment offerings, perhaps exhibiting not only a preference for
entertainment over televised news programming, but also a disconnect from, and
distaste for, the imposed unitary language and presumptions underlying the
95
provision and production of network news and, indeed, democratic culture itself.'
They continued to turn to television for pure pleasure and escapism, and soon also
for help in processing their everyday life experiences, which necessarily often
included discursive exchanges about politics and political news. 196 In doing so,
viewers challenged network news's and broadcast journalists' top down notions of
citizen engagement and political relevance. Television steadily evolved into a
medium through which human experiences and cultures were both fostered and

193. BAYM, supra note 1, at 13, 16 (discussing characterization of more than half of American
public as "news gazers" receiving information from a motley of sources at no particular set time of day).
194. See JONES, supra note 31, at 210 ("Citizenship is more than membership in a society. It is a
component of our identity ... a cultural phenomenon that is conceived, negotiated, assembled, fought
over ... through our everyday interactions within that society. The segregation of citizenship from
consumption, public from private, rationality from emotion ... is no longer tenable."). The network era
and modernity required a distinction between:
news and entertainment, and ultimately between politics and pleasure. It offered its viewers little
incentive to tune in beyond its . . . commitment to serving the needs of citizens. As such, it
depended on its appeal to the audience's sense of duty, the obligation of citizenship. In the face
of burgeoning entertainment choices, . . . such an approach to news ...

[was] ...

increasingly

untenable.
BAY-M, supra note 1, at 40. Indeed, in his recent book, former journalist Jack Fuller discusses the role of
emotions in aiding the brain in processing information. FULLER, supra note 17, at 64, 175. For Fuller,
the lack of emotions could actually lead to poor reasoning while appeals to emotions can be key to
helping one process and be attracted to information. Id.
195. BAYM, supra note 1, at 169; see also DAHLGREN, supra note 5, at 41; JONES, supra note 31,
at 21-25 (discussing that while traditional measures of civic engagement, such as voting, voluntarily
assisting in campaigning and following political knowledge declined considerably until the 2006 and
2008 campaigns, citizen's engagement became "textual" and participatory rather than formally
organizational in that the public clamored, often via negotiations in the media, to define their own social,
community and public identities). Indeed, such shift was also due to the shift in political and popular
cultural sentiments towards politics, politicians, political talk and, in turn, network news as exemplified
by the election of former actor Ronald Reagan, whose presidential campaign included calls for taking
back big government from the politicians and their bureaucratic posturing. Id. at 48.
196.
DAHLGREN, supra note 5, at 21; JONES, supra note 31, at 221-22 (providing that politics
came to be viewed as something that is not attended to separately and "cordoned off from the rest of
one's identity, activities or existence in the world. Politics ... [became] . . . one of many facets of a
person's life, and it too include[d] drama and humor, seriousness and entertainment, importance and
triviality").
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stifled.197 It increasingly became a way of aiding public understanding of the
everyday, the mundane, the entertaining and indeed, the political: it was the
medium through which the everyday was negotiated from a variety of points,
including the rational198and the pleasurable, and a sometimes simultaneous
comingling of the two.
The popular mass appeal of daytime talk shows, like "Donahue," manifested
such desired negotiations. 199 While "Donahue" and other such talk shows were
created ironically as a part of broadcasters' efforts to capitalize on growing popular
sentiments to be involved in political discourses, viewers participated in setting and
shaping political agendas through the studio audience and call in portions of the
shows. 200 Indeed, with former professional broadcast journalists as talk show hosts
on entertainment programming, ordinary citizens brought to the fore issues of
relevance to their everyday lives. 20 1 They also widened the mainstream political
discourse by discussing political news and engaging politicians and candidates
directly when they appeared on such shows-a discursive exchange once reserved
only for broadcast journalists and political correspondents. 20 2 In response,
mainstream broadcast journalists disapproved of such comingling of politics on
entertaining formats, as their print counterparts did with yellow journalism decades
earlier, and maintained their allegiance to reason, decorum and objectivity, even in
the face of decreasing viewership and civic engagement. 20 3 Viewers and their
viewing choices were dismissed as apathetic, self-interested and enslaved to their
prurient interests, which threatened the conceived purity and rationality of
204
democratic culture.
With the first Donahue decision, the FCC, under the leadership of Republican
Anne Jones, implicitly seemed unwilling to acknowledge the participatory
potentiality of talk shows like "Donahue," arguably falling back instead on
conventional network news norms of professionalism and the rational.20 5 Indeed,
although the FCC found that there was no evidence of any bad faith to provide
political advantage to any political candidate over another with respect to the
appearance, in its first Donahue decision, the agency denied Multimedia's original
197. DAHLGREN, supra note 5, at 40.
198. Id. Some scholars, however, in advocating for retrenchment from the market based approach
to broadcast regulation and for reform of media and public affairs programming, fail to acknowledge the
duality of the viewing consumer/citizen. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 41, at 514. Politicized
entertainment and viewer engagement with such programs reveal, however, that the interests of the
viewing public can be peeked simultaneously in his or her capacity as both consumer and citizen.
JONES, supra note 31, at 222 (referencing the extent to which cable show "Politically Incorrect"
simultaneously mingled politics and entertainment and, as a result, served as "a spark for drawing
viewers toward greater discursive participation in politics-one that includes their ritualized habits and
lives as cultural beings and citizens").
199. DAHLGREN, supra note 5, at 62-63.
200.
JONES, supra note 31, at 6.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203.
BAYM, supranote 1, at 1-2.
204. See generally JONES, supra note 31, at 25.
205. Multimedia Program Prod., Inc. (Donahue 1), 80 F.C.C.2d 217, 220 (1980).
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request for a bona fide news interview exemption. 20 6 The FCC took issue with the
format because live studio "audience participation... takes the 'Donahue' format
even further from the type of interview program contemplated by Congress in light
of the regular participation by the studio audience and their ability to express
personal views." 20 7 Specifically, the Commission found problematic the studio
audience's ability "to make statements and/or ask questions of the [political
candidates] ....Indeed, by allowing members of the audience to make statements,
the 'Donahue' program create[d] the very risks that Congress wanted to avoidnamely, a situation where a program could be used to advance the election of a
particular candidate." 20 8 Not only did the FCC find extrapolating the unfiltered,
nonbracketed opinions of the nonprofessional, studio audience problematic, but it
selected topics did not fit within
also determined that the majority of the show's
20 9
traditional understandings of bona fide news.
Upon reconsideration four years later, the FCC reversed its original Donahue
decision. 21 In doing so, credence was given to Multimedia's argument in the first
decision "that an evolution of innovative approaches to broadcast news
programming not available when Congress enacted the news exemptions in 1959"
should not preclude application of the exemption. 2 11 In addition, still perhaps
evidencing reluctance to totally unleash discourse to a nonprofessional studio
audience, in Donahue II, the FCC noted "Mr. Donahue's ability as a skilled
professional journalist to maintain absolute control over all aspects of the unique
'Donahue' format," and "to enhance the newsworthiness of individual
interviews."212 The Commission observed reassuringly that "Mr. Donahue cuts off
any questioner who fails to comply with these procedures, and he relates questions
posed by the audience in an attempt to focus upon what the licensee had
determined was the appropriate journalistic approach to a particular topic." 2 13 It
concluded that a failure to recognize "Donahue" as a bona fide news interview
program would send the message to broadcasters that in order to qualify for a bona
format of
fide news interview exemption, programs "should adhere only to the
214
certain programs mentioned by Congress over twenty-five years ago."
206. Id.
207. Id. at 222.
208. Multimedia Program Prod., Inc., 84 F.C.C.2d 738, 744 (1981); see also Multimedia Entm't,
Inc. (Donahue 1l),
1984 F.C.C. Lexis 2665, at *7 (1984).
209. Donahue 11, 1984 F.C.C. Lexis 2665, at *11-12. The show's topic lists for a three month
period included shows that were deemed purely entertainment oriented, which related to, among other
things, human interest stories like "The Super Mom Myth." Id. After its review of the list, the FCC
concluded: "[i]n total, it appears that 68% of the episodes reviewed are clearly not 'news-type
programs' as envisioned by Congress, and do not deal with current news events." Id.at * 11 n. 10. See
also Cmty. Antenna Television Sys., 20 F.C.C.2d 201, 222 (1969).
210. DonahueIf, 1984 F.C.C. Lexis 2665.
211. Id.at*2.
212. Id.at*l,*7.
213. Id. at*5.
214. Id. at*9. The FCC stressed that Congress not only referenced network news and related
public affairs programs like "Meet the Press" and "Face the Nation" in the legislative history of the 1959
amendment as examples of bona fide news interview programs, but also referenced an innovative
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Finally, to further effectuate congressional stated goals to "enable what probably
has become the most important medium of political information to give the news
concerning political races to the greatest number of citizens, and to make it possible
to cover the political news to the fullest degree," the FCC made clear that not only
was the format immaterial, but that so also were the segments of the "Donahue"
show that did not pertain "directly to the political arena, or even to current news
events." 2 15 If a show provided regularly scheduled news interviews with political
candidates, the FCC found that the show could be entitled to an exemption from the
equal time rule even if it was not specifically a regularly scheduled network news
or related public affairs program. 216 Although the FCC reiterated that deference as
to newsworthiness of a candidate's appearance was to be given to the broadcaster,
the FCC, within the same year, published a Political Primer on Political
Broadcasting. 2 17 While Donahue H expanded the bona fide news interview
exemption beyond its traditional application to network news and similar public
affairs programming, the FCC, through its Political Primer, emphasized the
importance of political news remaining substantive and newsworthy, irrespective of
the format in which it was provided.2t5
Indeed, the Primer added two additional factors to the other four to be
considered when determining whether a program qualified for the exemptions
under § 315(a):
(a) does the interview take place on a bonafide news program? If so, the interview is
exempt regardless of its subject matter, the type of person interviewed or whether the
news program always contains interviews. .. (b) [i]f the interview does not take place
on a bona2 19fide news program, does it take place on a bona fide news interview
program?

More importantly, it specifically stated that "[m]any 'interview' and 'talk'
programs do not qualify as news interview programs." 220 Finally, in referencing
"bona fide news programs" in the Political Primer as an automatic application of
the exemption, the FCC seemed to defer again to network news programming,
which up until that time provided political news pursuant to-and in broadcaster
acknowledgement of-broadcast journalists' assumed watchdog and deliberative
obligations. 221 FCC interpretations of the bona fide newscast and news interview
exemptions, however, soon contradicted both the congressional intent underlying
the enactment of the equal time rule and the import placed on sustaining
political
222
news and its newsworthiness in DonahueII and the Political Primer.
While the Donahue II decision theoretically unraveled network news's
program at the time called "Youth Wants To Know" that involved questions posed by students. Id.
215.
Id. at *15; 105 CONG. REc. 14451 (1959) (emphasis added).
216. Donahue11, 1984 F.C.C. Lexis 2665 at *13.
217. Political Primer, 100 F.C.C.2d 1476 (1984).
218. See id.
219. Id. at 1496 (emphasis added)
220. Id.
221.
Holcomb, supra note 26, at 100.
222. See Janow, supra note 26, at 1085.
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deliberatively limiting modernist conventions, its full potential in drawing in wider
audiences into the political discourse was cut short. It was undermined by
subsequent FCC deregulatory efforts and by deference to broadcast editorial
judgment that aimed to expand network news viewership to increase profits by
selling viewers as a commodity to advertisers rather than to facilitate a more
informed, inclusive and participatory public sphere. 223 Indeed, inquiries relating to
newsworthiness in the FCC's subsequent bona fide news cast and news interview
exemptions refocused on show format and were underscored by deference to a
broadcast journalism standard that was arguably slowly undone by market
pressures escalated by FCC deregulatory policies and resulting consolidation in
224
media ownership.
B.

DEREGULATION AND CONSOLIDATION

1. Professional Journalism as Spectacle
While the public sphere and political discourse had theoretically been widened
by Donahue II's recognition of alternate public discourse spaces (including
entertainment formats), this Article posits that the potential of such rulings was
stunted by the FCC's gradual and dramatic shift in its interpretation to broadcaster
public interest obligations as primarily market determinative. 225
President
Reagan's newly appointed FCC Commissioner, Mark Fowler, was the first FCC
Commissioner in the history of the FCC to advocate for the abandonment of the
public trustee interpretive standard of the public interest obligation in favor of a
market based approach.226 Pursuant to the market approach, the FCC gradually
moved-and still continues to move-toward complete deregulation of
broadcast. 227 It has repealed many public interest regulations adopted to limit
concentrated control over the nation's airwaves at the expense of local and diverse
public viewpoints. 228 Left by the wayside was the view that broadcasters were to
act as public trustees of the airwaves. Instead, the public interest standard was now
229
set by market determinants which turned on profit maximization and efficiency.
In one such deregulatory effort, the FCC, beginning in the mid to late 1980s,
adopted laws lifting the national and local caps on the number of broadcast stations
223.

See generally C. EDWIN BAKER, ADVERTISING AND A DEMOCRATIC PRESS, 25-87 (1994);

see also Sunstein, supra note 41, at 515 (noting that broadcasters provide content to retain a certain
advertiser desired demographic and to please such advertisers who "want programming that will put
viewers in a receptive purchasing mood, and hence not be too depressing," and that "[a]dvertisers also
tend to dislike programming that is highly controversial or that is too serious, and hence avoid
sponsoring shows that take stands on public issues" (internal quotations omitted)).
224. MCCHESNEY & NICHOLS, supra note 15, at 36-37.
225. See Wilfrid C. Rumble, The FCC's Reliance on Market Incentives to Provide Diverse
Viewpoints on Issues of Public Importance Violates the First Amendment Right to Receive Critical

Information, 28 U.S.F. L. REV. 793, 831-32 (1993-94).
226. Id.
227. See Rumble, supra note 225, at 834
228. See id.
229. See id at 832-34.
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any one person or corporation could own. 23 0 The effect of the repeal on ownership
caps combined with the shift to the market approach eventually trickled down to
the network news divisions as broadcast stations were bought out and taken over by
large media and entertainment conglomerates. 23 1 This brought an end to the literal
and proverbial division of entertainment programming and network news. With
decreasing enforcement of public interest informational and watchdog obligations,
new conglomerate owners abandoned public trustee obligations and focused instead
on attracting viewers to increase advertising revenue. 232 The resulting pressure on
broadcast journalists to retain network news's audience was intensified even more
by the variety of political news and public affairs programming provided on
cable. 2 33
Network news was recast and commoditized, as entertainment
programming had been for years, 234 Broadcast journalists were also set up as
celebrities and network news and political discourse were relegated to spectacle
in an effort to appeal to the viewer as consumer rather than as
and entertainment
23 5
citizen.
Despite the corporate squeeze behind the scenes, broadcast journalists continued
to publicly swear allegiance to an ethical code of objectivity and impartiality. 236 In
practice, these concepts were eventually reduced to a meaning that did not resemble
the watchdog functionality of the prior decades. Instead of shedding the light of
publicity on abuses of power and critically holding those in power accountable,
network news's ethical standards of objectivity and impartiality were reframed as
fair and balanced and essentially recast as uncritical and neutral.237 Moreover,
political news lost its substance and critique and was soon replaced with political
sound bites and distracting broadcast journalist chatter and subjective
commentary.23 8 Straight jacketed by commercial pressures, broadcast journalism
developed into "gotcha journalism" aimed at critiquing politicians' performance
and outing any inconsistencies rather than at interrogating politicians on the
substance of their positions. 239 Some scholars have argued that with commercial
pressures looming more prominently than in the earlier era of network journalism,

230. Gregory M. Prindle, No Competition: How Radio Consolidation Has Dismissed Diversity
and SacrificedLocalism, 14 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 279, 299 (2003).
231. Rumble, supra note 225, at 844-46.
232. BAYM, supra note 1, at 13; see Rumble, supra note 225, at 845-47.
233. ANDERSON, supra note 1, at xvii; BAYM, supra note 1, at 79-80.
234. BAYM, supra note 1, at 38 (discussing Disney's purchase of ABC and the resulting reference
to ABC journalists as "cast members" of Disney's production); W. LANCE BENNETTE ET AL., WHEN THE
PRESS FAILS: POLITICAL POWER AND THE NEWS MEDIA FROM IRAQ TO KATRINA 3 (2008) (asserting
that information passed off as political news has become largely governed by "pollsters, image shapers,
marketers, handlers, and spin doctors," and now shapes much of the public's political communication).
235. BAYM, supra note 1, at 55 ("Network journalists had abandoned the role of institutional
observer, and instead became characters in their own stories, their identities celebrated.").
236. See id. at 73 (discussing journalists' public statements on professional responsibility).
237. Id. at 68-69.
238. Id. at 55, 171 (discussing the cooptation of network news by rapid fire imagery and
soundbites to "transform it into an instrument of public opinion management rather an institution of
public information and accountability").
239. ld. at 74.
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broadcast journalists are simply no longer in a position to interrogate or critique
political figures. 240 Indeed, such inquiry was stifled due in part to broadcast
owners' increasing relationship with the politically powerful, who for lenient
coverage and favorable treatment on the air endorsed deregulatory efforts or
legislation favorable to their industry. 241 Indeed, despite efforts to effectuate
reframed notions of objectivity and impartiality via fair and balanced coverage,
some broadcast journalists became the targets of masterful media manipulation by
ultimately, became complicit in the manufacturing of political
politicians and,
24 2
spectacle.
2. Bona Fide News as Spectacle: "The Howard Stern Show" and Beyond
Just as broadcast journalists continued to reify a foregone journalism standard
despite the network news's and political culture's transformation into infotainment
and spectacle, FCC interpretations of the bona fide newscast and news interview
exemptions, as this Article posits, seemed to follow suit. For example, "The Sally
Jessy Raphael Show," which aired from 1983 to 2002, was granted the bona fide
news interview exemption in 1991, even with featured shows on "'Married Men
Who Act Like They're Single,' 'Cheating Wives' and 'Gay Men in Search of Rich
Lovers."' 243 The FCC granted the bona fide news interview exemption to
segments of the show on which a candidate might appear and decided, with one
conclusory sentence, "all topics are selected on the basis of newsworthiness in the
exercise of the producer's reasonable good faith judgment, with no intent to further
any candidacy." 244 Without any discussion of newsworthiness in the context of
politics or the enlargement of political discourse, the FCC noted that the show's
format met the factors of the bona fide news interview requirement that related to
the show being regularly produced and under the control of the broadcaster.2 45 It
noted also that "Ms. Raphael's 30 years of experience" in journalism "enable[d] her
by the studio audience so as to
to control the program's format and questioning
246
avoid the advancement of any candidate."
And in 1994, despite the warning contained in the Political Primer that not all
talk shows and related content qualified as satisfying the newsworthiness
requirement, the FCC granted the bona fide news interview exemption to segments
of "Jerry Springer" that might have contained interviews with political

240.

Rumble, supra note 225, at 844 (discussing consolidation of network ownership).

See

generally MCCHESNEY & NICHOLS,supra note 15, at 40.

241. Rumble, supra note 225, at 844 (discussing in detail how the conglomerates that took over the
networks, including network news divisions, "depend[ed] on the government for a broad range of policy
support, including favorable business taxes, interest rates, labor policies, and enforcement and
nonenforcement of the antitrust laws").
242.

BAYM, supra note 1, at 171.

243. Walter Goodman, Critic's Notebook; 3 Queens of Talk Wo Rule the Day, N.Y. TIMES, July
29, 1991, at C 11.
244. Multimedia Entm't, Inc. (The Sally Jessy Raphael Show), 6 FCC Red. 1798, 1798 (1991).
245.

Id.

246.

Id.
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candidates. 247 The ruling cited the oft-repeated statement that the host, Jerry
Springer (like Sally Jessy Raphael), was an experienced broadcast journalist, who
was able to prevent the advancement of a political candidate by the studio
audience. 248 It again summarily concluded that all topics were selected based upon
249
the broadcaster's good faith judgment as to newsworthiness.
More telling of the value placed on newsworthiness by the Political Primer,
however, is the fact that most of these decisions were granted in the context of a
declaratory ruling and without evidence that a single political candidate had even
been interviewed on such shows or, at the very least, even appeared on one. 250 In
addition, in 2003, the FCC declared that the radio broadcast of "The Howard Stern
Show" qualified as a bona fide news interview program exempt from the equal time
rule. 251 The show has since moved to Sirius satellite radio in a purported effort to
bypass FCC indecency broadcast regulations and fines. 252 It continues, however,
to air programming similar to that once aired on broadcast radio (and that often ran
afoul of FCC indecency regulations), such as "win a night with a porn star, fathers
taking off their daughters' clothes if they get an answer wrong, homeless jeopardy,
2 S3
[and] evaluating women to see if they're good enough for [P]layboy."
Moreover, without referencing or discussing any evidence of actual interviews with
political candidates, the FCC also implicitly absolved itself of future inquiries as to
whether political news was advanced by the appearance (should there actually be
one). Indeed, in the decision, the FCC provided that "we emphasize that licensees
airing programs that meet the statutory news exemption.., need not seek formal
declaration from the Commission that such programs qualify as news exempt
254
programming."
The FCC went on to grant the bona fide newscast exemption to those segments
of the shows "Entertainment Tonight" and "Entertainment This Week" on which a
247. Multimedia Entm't, Inc. (The Jerry Springer Show), 9 FCC Rcd. 2811 (1994). There was no
evidence in the record, however, or in a perusal of episode listings of "Jerry Springer" that it had ever
conducted such interviews with political candidates. Id. This fact notwithstanding, the FCC granted the
show the bona fide news interview exemption. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Infinity Broad. Operations Inc. (The HowardStern Show), 18 FCC Red. 18603 (2003).
252. Krysten Crawford, Howard Stern Jumps to Satellite, CNN (Oct. 6, 2004, 3:38 PM),
http://money.cnn.com/2004/10/06/news/newsmakers/stemsirius/.
253. HOWARD 101, http://www.sirius.com/howardl01 (last visited Aug. 5, 2010); Show Overview:
The
Howard
Stern
Show,
TV.coM,
http://www.tv.com/the-howard-stemshow/show/2217/summary.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2011) (describing the filmed version of Howard
Stem's broadcast radio show) (pdf on file with author).
254. The Howard Stern Show, 18 FCC Rcd. at 18604; see also Ricchiuto, supra note 14, at 283.
Ricchiuto writes:
This directive by the FCC seems to be urging broadcasters not to bother with petitioning for an
exemption, but to rely on their independent judgment as to whether the exception applies to
them-not merely as to specific broadcasts, but for their programs as a whole. The signal sent to
broadcasters ... is that all but the most outrageous requests will be granted-allowing more and
more media outlets to ignore equal time..
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candidate appeared; the FCC made clear that it would not delve into defining news
or valuing one type of news over another, but would defer such determinations
instead to a broadcaster's judgment. 255 In doing so, it continued to punt to
broadcaster judgment that aimed to retain viewers as a saleable commodity to
advertisers rather than to civically engage them with political news or by
facilitating political discourse. To the FCC, any news of current events sufficed to
satisfy the bona fide newscast exemption-based in part on the fact that the format
of both shows utilized "the same methods and journalistic guidelines typical of
traditional newscasting." 256 It concluded that absent bad faith, an appearance alone
"by legally qualified candidates during [these newslike shows]... should be
accorded the bona fide newscast exemption." 257 This decision essentially endorsed
the notion that political appearances alone on a program similar in format to
traditional network news are sufficient to meet the exemptions requirement, even
absent a discursive exchange in some way related to political news or the
enhancement of political discourse. 258 Ironically, the FCC asserted that an
appearance on such an entertaining show should be as exempt as it would be on a
traditional televised newscast program, which as a result of recent industry
developments now also covered religion, business, sports and other entertaining
content. 259 In doing so, the FCC again tapped away at the erroneous presumptions
underlying the division of network news formats and entertainment programming
entertainment format alone should
for deliberative purposes and reaffirmed that an
260
exemptions.
these
of
granting
the
preclude
not
Finally, in the midst of the chaos caused by broadcast journalism's
conversion to spectacle, politicians capitalized on the confusion and began to
appear on entertaining shows not only for popular cultural appeal and mass
exposure, but also for presumptive softball interviews with little depth on political
news or interrogation into the issues. 261 Indeed, beginning in 1992, candidates
regularly announced their candidacies on several talk shows, and noticeably
avoided news programming and the "gotcha journalism" into which network

255. Paramount Pictures Corp. (Entm 't Tonight), 3 FCC Red. 245 (1988).
256. Id. at 246.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id. In contrast however, the implication of the FCC's decision to grant "The 700 Club" bona
fide newscast exempt status on the news portions of its show is that a network news format alone, if
provided in a way similar to and consistent with "journalistic news principles," is sufficient, irrespective
of whether the actual information provided is political news. Id. Indeed, because "The 700 Club's"
newscast segments include anchors and reporter interviews, the show qualifies for the bona fide
newscast exemption as it "report[s] some news of some area of current events, in a manner similar to
more traditional newscasts." The Christian Broad. Network for Declaratory Ruling, 23 FCC Rcd. 7165,
7166 (2008) (internal quotations omitted). See generally Clay Calvert, Toxic Television, Editorial
Discretion & the Public Interest: A Rocky Mountain Low, 21 HASTiNGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 163

(discussing the law's distinguishing protection of violent content in news programming but not
entertainment programming, even when provided to retain viewers for rating purposes).
261. JONES, supra note 31, at 178.
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journalism had developed.262 However, Arnold Schwarzenegger's announcement
of his candidacy for a second term as governor of California on his friend Jay
Leno's "The Tonight Show" garnered much controversy and resulted in a
complaint being filed with the FCC by one of
the many other gubernatorial
263
candidates demanding equal airtime on the show.
The FCC aptly rejected the distinctions the complainant made between the
show's entertainment format and network news formats, and between Jay Leno as a
comedian and the journalists-come-talk-show-impresarios who hosted other
entertainment type shows previously granted the bona fide news interview
exemption. 264 In addition, the FCC downplayed the newsworthiness issue by
refraining it as related solely to whether Schwarzenegger's invitation to appear on
the show was evidence of political partisanship, given his close relationship with
Leno and Leno's public support of Schwarzenegger during his first term as
governor. 265 In dismissing the claim of political partisanship as speculative (it was
grounded only on evidence that the two were friends), the FCC summarily
concluded that the appearance was scheduled pursuant to the broadcaster's good
faith broadcast judgment as to newsworthiness.266 The FCC noted favorably that
Schwarzenegger discussed his views on "immigration
reform, bipartisan legislative
267
activities in California, and the war in Iraq."
Problematically, it went on to state, in the same paragraph that summarily settled
on the broadcaster's good faith judgment, that Schwarzenegger's national celebrity
status as a movie star was of interest to the program's national audience and was,
therefore, evidence of nonpartisanship and of the newsworthiness of his
appearance.2 68 The implication then is that political news, and not just the format
in which it is provided, can be reduced to a commoditized product and, as a result,
can be stripped and diluted of the critical information necessary for self262. ANDERSON, supra note 1, at xiii. Indeed, both John Kerry and George W. Bush solicited
votes by appearing on the "Dr. Phil" show during their presidential campaigns. JONES, supra note 31, at
178.
263.
The Tonight Show with Jay Leno, 21 FCC Rcd. 11919 (2006).
264. See id. at 11924.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. In addition, in citing its "Entertainment Tonight" decision, the FCC distinguished Jay
Leno's satirical monologue at the beginning of the show as pure entertainment and therefore not
sufficient to satisfy the bona fide news exemption, and also determined that "brief skits," "live
performances from entertainment talent," "music, comedy, or other forms of pure entertainment" are not
sufficient to meet the congressional intent for the bona fide news interview exemption. Id.While the
FCC here distinguishes pure entertainment from entertainment that performs a deliberative function, this
Article posits that the FCC, however, has not created a similar delineation with regard to the interview
itself in furthering the provision of political news or the deliberative process or with regard more broadly
to network news facilitation of the same goals. Moreover, while this Article does not ultimately advance
the idea that the FCC should determine what constitutes a substantive discourse of political news, the
point instead is that political news, irrespective of the format on which it is provided, must be cautiously
guarded and advanced via a deliberative infrastructure that promotes its critical and substantive, rather
than solely commercial development. See infra Part II (proposing remedies to creating and sustaining it
as such).

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS

[34:3

governance. This Article contends that diluting, commoditizing or manipulating
political news itself for any reason, including for profit, threatens the deliberative
structure on which the First Amendment stands and directly contravenes the
purposes underlying the enactment of the equal time rule and its bona fide news
exemption.269 It also maintains that such manipulation exceeds the broadened
application of the bona fide newscast and news interview exemptions to
entertaining formats permitted by Donahue II and the Political Primer. By
continuing to summarily defer to a broadcasters' good faith judgment in these
decisions, the FCC has presumed that such interviews and appearances-on either
network news or entertainment formats-were conducted with the same
investigative and interrogatory watchdog tenacity and commitment embraced in the
earlier public trustee era of broadcast journalism. As a result, the FCC and the
current spectacle of network news became complicit in the manipulative political
media climate in which such calculated interviews and appearances are advanced.
The development of shows like "Politically Incorrect" and "The Daily Show"
establishes, however, that the key to reviving a critical and engaging broadcast
journalism is not necessarily a return to the network era formats, or even to ethics
of old.270 While embracing public trustee obligations, network era journalism
norms still perpetuated a narrowed and exclusionary public sphere that insisted,
among other things, on separating political news and network news programming
from entertaining programming, and ultimately aided in turning its audience away.
Shows like "The Daily Show" establish, however, that both can coexist without
devaluating each other. Indeed, at times, both are needed to draw in and connect
with participants in the current hyper-commercialized and sensationalized mediarich environment of the twenty-first century, where grabbing the attention of the
public is key.
3. Politicized Entertainment as Subaltern Public: "Politically Incorrect" as
Bona Fide News
While network news floundered in retaining viewers to sustain advertising
269. Author Harry Frankfurt appeared on "The Daily Show" two weeks after Ari Fleisher, former
Bush Press Secretary, appeared on the show and admitted that the Bush Administration actively
controlled the information provided to the public. BAYM, supra note 1, at 1]7. Frankfurt discussed his
book, On Bullshit, and his disdain for the marketing of political speech and spin. He distinguished
"bullshit" from lying and argued that the latter was a willful misrepresentation of the truth while the
former was worse and evidence of a lack of concern for whether the statement was true or false. Id. For
Frankfurt, bullshit was "a more insidious threat to society because it undermines respect for the truth,
while political spin was nothing more than a form of bullshit where speakers are "engaged in the
enterprise of manipulating opinion, not in the enterprise of reporting the facts." Id. at 118. To him,
bullshit was speech lacking in sustenance and nutritive informational value. See HARRY G. FRANKFURT,
ON BULLSHIT (2005).

270. See generally JONES, supra note 3 1, at 172 (discussing how "The Daily Show's" Jon Stewart
regularly made clear that "[j]oumalistic adherence to norms of objectivity generally prevent[ed] many
reporters and anchors from looking across specific events to explicitly point out repeated patterns of
deception or misjudgment by politicians and government officials (unless the reporting occurs in
investigative or opinion-editorial pieces)").
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revenues, cable--cushioned by subscription fees-took greater creative risks in
attracting viewers. 27 1 Building on the same popular participatory sentiments
targeted earlier by the producers of daytime talk shows, cable introduced
"Politically Incorrect" in 1993 on the Comedy Central channel.272 With comedian
Bill Maher as host, the show bridged the gap between purely entertaining late night
fare and political pundit talk shows and ushered in a new era of politicized
entertainment on television. 273 Bill Maher and his nonexpert guests, usually
including at least one celebrity, often discussed political and social issues of the
day like the Clinton-Lewinsky scandal. 274 In doing so, like "Donahue" decades
earlier, it more closely resembled the language and public opinion of everyday
citizens than those of the experts on mainstream network news or cable pundit talk
shows. 275 Indeed, such discussions were:
in a language resembling more of what would be found in a bar, basement, or
barbershop than what occurs at the National Press Club or on Meet the Press-a

common vernacular that is accessible and familiar [with] commonsensical notions to
what politics means than the conventional elite discourse on television that276is largely
derived from insider knowledge and concerned with political maneuvering.
Through common sense and humor, which was "lacking on most political talk
shows... [and which] ... became an important tool of political critique,"
"Politically Incorrect" mixed entertainment and popular culture with politics and
the rational realm. 277 In doing so, it encouraged the viewing audience
to look
278
beyond the arbitrary boundaries traditionally drawn between the two.
Moreover, in satirizing the Clinton-Lewinsky scandal, "Politically Incorrect"
pointed out that politics, like anything else, was a performance filled with drama
and spectacle, and made clear that politics was not just a "special preserve for those
who traffic in insider knowledge and employ a specialized language." 279 When it
moved from cable to ABC's network in 1997 to attract the advertiser desired age
eighteen to forty-nine demographic in the late night market, the show gained wider
visibility for this new highly popular genre of television. 280 The show flung open
"the doors of political talk, challenging normative conceptions of acceptable
271. JONES, supra note 31, at 65.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 64.
274. Id. at 67. Celebrities represented to the viewing public outsiders to the political machine and
bureaucracy, who, like the viewing public, most likely did not follow news as closely as the insiders and
pundits. Id. Interestingly, the show's top viewers requested, and received in the show's run from 19992000, a regular citizen, called a "Citizen Panelist," as a nonexpert guest. Id.
275. Id. The show represented "a hybrid blend of politics and social issues, humor and serious
discourse, comedic monologues and group discussions, celebrities and less well-known public
personalities, and lay and elite discourses." Id.
at 68.
276. Id. at 66.
277. Id. at 66-67.
278. Id. Common sense has been defined as "a means through which publics think through and
discuss deeper 'ideological dilemmas' that often lie at the heart of public issues and events." Id. at 66.
279. Id. at 70.
280. Id. at 67.
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political discourse, including who exactly was allowed to talk about politics," and
insisted that "any citizen had the right to talk about political life, even if for
entertainment purposes." 28 1 In 1999, the FCC affirmed once again that an
entertainment format alone was not prohibitive to the bona fide news exemption,
when it granted the exemption to the entire show and not just segments of the show
on which a candidate appeared. 282 In citing Hustler v. Falwell,where the Supreme
Court found political cartoons and satire relevant to political discourse, the FCC
also made clear that "the presence of satire as an element ... should not prevent the
program from being considered bona fide in terms of good faith news
judgment." 283 It also determined that "satire in the form of a broadcast monologue
about news of the day or during discussion of such issues does
not appear less
284
important in the realm of political debate than political cartoons."
Despite the favorable FCC ruling, "Politically Incorrect" was cancelled-largely
due to the withdrawal of major advertising sponsorship in response to boycott
threats by members of the public who were offended by Maher's statements about
the September 11, 2001 bombings. 285 Maher returned to television in 2003 on the
cable channel HBO on "Real Time with Bill Maher," which was somewhat
removed from advertiser and broadcast censorship. 286 The new, slightly altered
show now featured three guests at a table facing Maher alone. 287 With his return,
he was obviously afforded increased respect as an interviewer and political
commentator; high profile politicians now appeared on the show, arguably due in
no small part to the popular success of "The Daily Show," which had surfaced

281. Id. at 71. Arguably, this new genre of politicized entertainment seems different from
"Donahue" and similar day time talk shows of the early 1980s in that political news may have been
discussed on those programs, but was not discussed necessarily for the purpose of entertaining while
also informing, as is, or has been, the case and/or effect of "Politically Incorrect" and later, "The Daily
Show."
282. In the FCC's "Jay Leno" decision, it did not grant the entire show, as here, the bona fide news
exemption because Leno's monologue was deemed as pure entertainment and not directly connected to
the interview of the political candidate. See The Tonight Show with Jay Leno, 21 FCC Rcd. 11919
(2006). Here, the implication of the "Politically Incorrect" decision is that the FCC found deliberative
value in this entertainment format as it relates specifically to political discourse, as is evident in its
granting of the exemption to the entire show with Maher's comingling of political news and satire. See
ABC, Inc. (PoliticallyIncorrect), 15 FCC Rcd. 1355, 1359 (1999); see also supra Part II.B.2.
283. Politically Incorrect, 15 FCC Rcd. at 1359 (referencing Hustler v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 54
(1988)).
284. Id.
285. See Bill Carter, ABC to End 'PoliticallyIncorrect',N.Y. TiMEs, May 14, 2002, at C8. In a
discussion with conservative panelist guest Dinesh D'Souza where both were critiquing President
Bush's labeling of the September 11 bombers as cowards, Maher stated, "We have been the cowards,
lobbing cruise missiles from 2, 000 miles away. That's cowardly. Staying in the airplane when it hits
the building, say what you want about it, it's not cowardly." JONES, supra note 31, at 73. While Maher
later attempted to explain that he was referring to American military conduct during the Clinton
administration, Maher was roundly attacked and accused of being unpatriotic during a time of
uncertainty and instability in American political culture and sentiment. Id. Seventeen networks
affiliates dropped his show along with two major advertisers, namely Sears and Federal Express. Id.
286. Id. at 84.
287. Id.
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during Maher's hiatus. 288 "The Daily Show," with host Jon Stewart, had stepped
into the politicized entertainment void left by Maher in 1999, and with its "fake"
news program ironically became the interrogating force attacking what was
professed as truth by political pundit talk shows and broadcast journalists. 289 It
adopted a fake network news format but used entertaining satirical comedy to
spectacle created by
critique and shed much needed light on the political
2 90
politicians, network news and political pundit talk shows.
During Stewart's interviews with notable political guests, he "explore[d]
background and context of current events, [with] some explain[ing] basic
institutional processes-the kind of information essential to understanding public
affairs but usually missing in most forms of [network] news." 291 In addition, he
also exposed "the lack of honesty in political talk and the proclivity among public
figures to adhere strictly to the talking points and partisan spin that turn public
discourse into marketing." 292 Moreover, in between the "masterful information
management techniques and fear-mongering by the Bush administration and a
television news media that helped facilitate these deceptions and ruses through its
weak reporting and tendency toward patriotic spectacle," "The Daily Show"
"became the perfect format for questioning the faux 'reality' that was increasingly
being created through the manipulations, distortions, and outright lying of the Bush
293
administration and a compliant, sloppy, and sensationalistic news media."
Notably, unlike broadcast journalism's continued claim to being the sole

288. Id. at 85.
289. BAYM, supranote 1, at 7.
290. Id.at 105. Moreover, in 2005, Comedy Central introduced another "fake" news show--"The
Colbert Report," itself a spin off of "The Daily Show"--that took aim at the right wing political pundit
talk programs and Fox News and their blatant appeal to feelings over truth and facts (referred to by
Stephen Colbert, the show's host, as "truthiness"). Id at 80. While "The Daily Show" satirized the
news, "The Colbert Report" satirized those who cover the news, how they talk about it, and how it
should be processed. JONES, supra note 31, at 185. Ironically, six months after the show aired, Colbert
was invited to President Bush's White House Correspondents' Association Dinner in which he appeared
in character and proceeded, unbeknownst to the attendees, to satirically offer a scathing critique of Bush
and his press corps for providing what amounted to "truthiness" to the public. See ColbertRoasts Bush,
YoUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BSEsaVX_2A (last visited Feb. 9, 2011) (although
Colbert's "tribute" received little mainstream press coverage, this video posted on the Internet of Colbert
roasting Bush at the White House Correspondents' Association Dinner on August 26, 2007 spread
quickly and indicates that it received well over one million viewer hits).
291. BAYM, supranote 1,at 116.
292. Id at 117. Interestingly, David Chang has argued that to the extent broadcasters provide
information only for purposes of attracting viewers as a commodity to advertisers, they should not be
granted first amendment protections since the First Amendment's goal in preserving speech rights is to
advance deliberative discourse by parties engaged in speech for that purpose and not for the purpose of
marketing infotainment to retain viewers for advertising revenue purposes. See generally David Chang,
Selling the Market-Driven Message: Commercial Television, Consumer Sovereignty, and the First
Amendment, 85 MINN. L. REV. 451 (2000).
293. JONES, supra note 31, at 75. Indeed, in his interview with former Bush Press Secretary Ari
Fleischer, Stewart got Fleisher to unapologetically admit that President Bush and his administration
controlled and restricted the flow of information to the public more so than any other presidency. See
Interview with Ari Fleiseher, THE DAILY SHOW WITH JON STEWART (Oct. 14, 2008),
http://www.thedailyshow.com/watch/tue-october-14-2008/ari-fleischer.
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gatekeeper of the objectively truthful political news, "The Daily294
Show" was "fake"
in that it refused to profess to be the authority on what was true.
To Stewart, his show was in fact about not knowing what the truth was or about
whether the truth was even discoverable. It was instead, "as with most social and
political satire [and] humor ... a means of reestablishing common sense truths to
counter the spectacle, ritual, pageantry, artifice, and verbosity that often cloak the
powerful. 295 His show exposed how "slavish devotion to certain factual reporting
can create conditions where truth becomes lost in the process." 296 In an interview
with veteran network journalist Ted Koppel on ABC's news program "Nightline,"
Stewart argued that the news media must be committed to processing rather than
"simply repeating what politicians say and, in effect, becoming willing or unwitting
conduits for dis(information). 2 97 More importantly, for Stewart, it must "play a
role in questioning and poking holes in public rhetoric without insisting that the
audience adopt its own truths." 298 Stewart's show, "Politically Incorrect" and its
reincarnate, "Real Time with Bill Maher," do just that through the entertaining "use
of satire, parody, and humor as a means of getting at deeper truths within the newspolitics dialect, including questioning the authority of the agents within that
dialect." 299 While these shows entertain and generate a laugh, "their deeper thrust
is subversion, an attack on the conventions and pretentions of contemporary
television news." 30 0 Moreover, they reveal the duality of entertainment, which30is1
not only to amuse or give pleasure, but also to engage with and to consider.
Indeed, viewers of these shows are both entertained and invited to consider the
current spectacle of democratic political culture and current news programming, as
exposed on these shows' own rights of publicity.
III. SUGGESTED REMEDIES TO BROADCAST JOURNALISM'S
DELIBERATIVE PERIL
Despite the explosion of the blogosphere and the ease and accessibility of the

294. JONES, supra note 31, at 182 ('The Daily Show' is fake only in that it refuses to make claims
to authenticity. But being fake does not mean that the information it imparts is untrue.").
295. Id. at 182-83. Indeed, in Stewart's much anticipated appearance on the public affairs
program, "Crossfire," Stewart, to the dismay of "Crossfire's" host who assumed Stewart would engage
in the light banter and humor typified on his show, instead accused "Crossfire" of being fake with "a
contrived bit of political theater that indulged in partisan spin while posing as a viable public affairs
program." BAYM, supra note 1, at 103.
296. JONES, supra note 31, at 78.
297. Id. at 76.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 86. In addition, these show are markedly different from a short lived genre of
commoditized politics produced on cable public affairs and news programs channels, like CNN's
"Chocolate News" with comedian D.L. Hughley, which represented the reverse process of the
"entertainmentization of news channel programming [where] news channels have employed news and
current events as the content for crafting low-cost entertainment programs that can 'lighten their more
serious programming schedule, [and] attract younger audiences." Id. at 87-90.
300. BAYM, supranote 1, at 113.
301. Id.
at 120.
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Internet in distributing information, the popularity of these shows confirms the
continued mobilizing ability and mass appeal and reach of television in a mediated
public sphere. They also establish television's continued relevance to and potential
for facilitating a more robust and participatory discourse. America (especially the
country's younger generations) is tuned into these shows, which have widened the
political discourse through entertaining programming that often includes political
candidate appearances. 303023 They have also enhanced critical and substantive public
knowledge and inquiry.
Broadcast journalists, in contrast, have exposed the fallacy of their own claims
to being gatekeepers of the authenticated and objective truth through their very own
The
public blunders involving fabricated and unverified news stories. 30 4
informational and participatory value of hybrid political entertainment talk shows
highlight the need for a wider, more interactive and critical journalism
infrastructure to advance the principles of the First Amendment as reflected in
America's early press and deliberative history.
While there is much still to be learned from such shows regarding the
deliberative value of television and entertainment, two or three shows alone are
simply insufficient to sustain the requisite watchdog and critical journalism
infrastructure that is necessary for a self-governed society. 30 5 "The Daily Show"
and "Real Time" take much of their lead from the network news's and political
pundit talk shows' stories of the day, aptly exposing inaccuracies, folly and
30 6
manipulation as mainstream investigative reporting begins to face challenges.
However, they rarely uncover new political news--often unearthed by costly and
timely investigative journalism--or discuss local political news or information not
brought to national attention. 30 7 In addition, their searing satirical critique of the
news media and politics is not accessible to those segments of the population who
may either be unwilling or unable to pay the monthly premium for cable or Internet
in order to view them. 30 8 More importantly, they too are subject to the whims of

302. Id.atlll,113.
303. Id. at 6. Indeed, recent studies have revealed that while most Americans are now news gazers
who acquire political news and information from a motley of sources, the public reportedly received
more political news and information from "The Daily Show" than any other network news
programming, political pundit talk shows or other public affairs programming. Id. Moreover, another
study suggested that among some groups Jon Stewart was deemed one of the most reliable journalists on
television, standing alongside many veteran network journalists. Michiko Kakutani, Is Jon Stewart the
in
America?,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Aug.
17,
2008,
Most
Trusted
Man
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/17/arts/television/17kaku.html?pagewanted=all.
304. JONES, supra note 31, at 181 (discussing story fabrication by Jason Blair at the New York
Times and Stephen Glass at the New Republic and poor fact checking on President Bush's Air National
Guard records by Dan Rather as negatively effecting public trust in professional journalists).
305.
Scholars have noted, documented and lamented the "steady decline in civic understanding...
[that is] ... producing a dangerous spiral of frustration and disenchantment." LANE & ORESKES, supra
note 47, at 203-04.
306. See generally MCCHESNEY & NICHOLS, supranote 15, at 96-99; see also LANE & ORESKES,
supranote 47, at 203-04.
307. See supra Part II.C.
308. Sunstein, supranote 41, at 528. Indeed,
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targeted demographic, as the cancellation of "Politically
the market and the
3 09
Incorrect" reveals.
Many scholars have convincingly argued that political news is a public good that
should not be subject to the variability of the market, given its necessity for
sustaining a self-governing democracy. 310 Supporters also point out that market
externalities and inefficiencies will always lead to insufficient or narrowed
coverage and provision of political news because of, among other things, the
unequal weight given to the preferences of the desired viewing demographic, which
often turns primarily on race, gender and socioeconomic status. 311 Congressional
attempts to amplify broadcast television's deliberative capacity by imposing public
interest obligations on broadcasters in exchange for their free use of the spectrum
have been quite challenging and, at times, an administrative nightmare to
enforce. 312 For example, the equal access rule requires broadcasters to provide
airtime to qualifying candidates at rates discounted from those charged to
advertisers, a requirement that broadcasters might arguably evade or minimally
meet, if at all, since to do so undercuts profit maximization. 313 In addition, the
bona fide news exemptions, particularly the bona fide newscast and news interview
complaints and
exemptions, often require the FCC to review and decide individual
3 14
declaratory requests to ascertain whether the exemptions are met.
Current FCC interpretation of the bona fide news exemptions has failed the
broader congressional goal of enhancing broadcast television's deliberative role in
facilitating public discourse through political candidate appearances. This Article
contends that it erroneously continues to defer to the broadcast judgment that now
provides uncritical political spin as news, usually clothed either in the guise of
traditional news programming or as a candidate appearance on an entertainment
show. 315 Such content panders to advertisers and no longer seeks to serve the
traditional informational and watchdog goals of broadcast journalism; financial
pressures may, in fact, render it entirely unable to serve these goals. Proposals to

broadcasters will continue to be seen by a disproportionate number of people ... [who] ... will

continue to have access only to broadcasters; this significant subgroup is important partly
because of its sheer size and partly because it includes an especially high percentage of people,
including children, who are poor and poorly educated.
Id.
309.
310.

See Carter, supra note 285, at C8.
See, e.g., MCCHESNEY & NICHOLS, supranote 15, at 102; see also Sunstein, supra note 41, at

517.

311.

MCCHESNEY & NICHOLS, supra note 15, at 103-04; Angela Campbell, Toward a New

Approach to Public Interest Regulation of Digital Broadcasting, in DIGITAL BROADCASTING AND THE
PUBLIC INTEREST, supranote 145, at 15-18.

312. Henry Geller, Implementation of "Pay" Models and the Existing Public Trustee Model in the
Digital Broadcast Era, in DIGITAL BROADCASTING AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST, supra note 145, at 23234.
313. Steven S. Wildman & D. Karen Frazer, A Structure and Efficiency Approach to Reforming
Access and Content Policy, in DIGITAL BROADCASTING AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST, supra note 145, at
213.
314. See Janow, supra note 26, at 1078-80.
315. See supra Part II.B.2.
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remedy this lack in broadcast journalism presume that broadcasters should continue
to be subject to public interest obligations that grew out of the scarcity doctrine set
forth in the Red Lion decision-a doctrine that has consistently been under wideespecially since the development of other
ranging attack since its inception and
316
media and communications outlets.
The primary premises underlying the development of the scarcity doctrine
remain true in that the broadcast airwaves themselves are still scarce, that the
demand for broadcast licenses continues to far surpass supply and that broadcast
licenses remain in the hands of a consolidated and monopolizing few.3 7 Indeed,
even today with the explosion in media options ranging from cable and satellite to
the Internet and portable MP3 players, a handful of corporations control a majority
of the nation's air waves. 3 18 Moreover, Red Lion is still good law, such
technological developments notwithstanding. 319 In addition, even in the face of
decades of attacks on the scarcity doctrine, Congress affirmed broadcasters' public
interest obligations in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, where it also granted
existing broadcasters free licensure of the newly developed and highly valuable
In addition, three years after the passage of the
digital spectrum. 320
Telecommunications Act, President Clinton commissioned an Advisory Committee
study, referred to often as the Gore Commission, to ascertain what broadcast public
interest obligations should be (not whether they should continue) in light of the
pending digital transition.321 Any proposed remedies to revive and enhance
television's deliberative capacity must, however, take into consideration what
broadcasters will and can do. FCC regulatory approaches thus far have expected
broadcasters, as corporate entities, to operate in such a way that in essence conflicts
with their profit making bottom line. 322 Moreover, any calls for increased
regulatory obligations (as advanced in some respects by the Advisory Committee)
must also consider that the FCC is already overwhelmed with keeping pace
administratively with existing regulatory demands.
Therefore, this Article contends that a revised funding and regulatory scheme is
needed to foster television's deliberative capacity, especially as it relates to
316.
317.
318.
319.

See Red Lion v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969)
Id. at 388, 390-91.
ANDERSON, supranote 1, at 7.
See Thomas W. Hazlett, et al., The Overly Active Corpse of Red Lion, 9 NW. J. TECH. &

INTELL. PROP. 51, 51-52 (2010).

320. Sunstein, supra note 41, at 503 (discussing the free digital licensure to broadcasters as a huge
giveaway of a "$70 billion national asset" (citing 47 U.S.C. § 336(a) (2006))). Broadcasters were also
allowed to hold on to their analog licenses until they decided how to use, and/or had fully developed
uses for, the digital spectrum. 47 U.S.C. § 336(f)(4). On June 13, 2009, all analog signals on broadcast
television transitioned to digital, which required analog broadcast television viewers to purchase a
digital receiver in order to watch broadcast programming on their television sets. DTV Delay Act, Pub.
L. No. 111-4, § 2(a)(1), 123 Stat. 112 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 309 (2009)).
321. See ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 54, at 1-2. This new digital technology grants
broadcasters the opportunity to amplify their channel and programming options far above those
permitted technologically pursuant to analog transmissions. Id. at 3-5.
322. Henry Geller, Public Interest Regulation in the Digital TV Era, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 341, 348 (1998).
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broadcasters' provision of political news, substantive interviews and exchanges
with those seeking political office. Concurrent with the study undertaken by the
Advisory Committee, scholars of the Aspen Institute Communications and Society
published a report that analyzed not only: 1) the enhanced public trustee model,
subsequently endorsed by the Gore Commission, but also four other models,
namely 2) the spectrum fee model, 3) the pay and access model, 4) the pay or play
model and 5) the pay and compete model.323 Although arguments supporting
continued regulation of broadcast television are perfectly sound and plausible given
the continued scarcity of the medium and the importance of political news, this
Article ultimately endorses the adoption of a quasi-deregulatory approach via a
slightly modified pay and compete model that factors in the equal time rule, as it
relates specifically to enhancing the provision of political news via candidate
appearances on television programming. 324 The pay and compete approach is
ultimately a superior scheme to the either/or approach that historically and
currently underlies most broadcast public interest regulation and policy. Moreover,
it is also superior to the other proposed models because it addresses their gaps and
deficiencies.
A.

EXPLORING AND CRITIQUING OTHER PROPOSED APPROACHES

1. Enhancing Public Interest Obligations
While the proposal for increased public trustee obligations would be the easiest
to implement because such a structure is theoretically already in place, the proposal
is problematic as it relates specifically to the provision of political news for a
number of reasons-some of which have already been discussed above. The
proposal not only overlooks the historic challenges in enforcing such a regulatory
scheme, but also overlooks the probable political resistance to a scheme that more
than likely will heighten FCC powers to regulate content. Moreover, it sidesteps
the need for increased public broadcasting funding ("PBS") while the other paybased models address this need directly by diverting fees in some fashion to
PBS.325
323.

See generally THE ASPEN INST., DIGITAL BROADCASTING AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST, supra

note 145.
324. See generally Wildman & Frazer, supra note 313, at 193; see also Folami, supra note 127, at
187 (discussing regulatory remedies to open up access to the nation's broadcast radio airwaves for
subverted discourse found in the music of the marginalized within the context of conglomerated
ownership).
325. See generally Wildman & Frazer, supra note 313; see also Campbell, supra note 311, at 24.
When compared with other industrialized nations, the American contribution to public broadcasting is
significantly lower. For example, the American government spends only about $1 per capita on public
broadcasting, exponentially less than other nations, such as Britain, which currently spends $38 per
capita on public broadcasting.

DANIEL C. HALLIN & PAOLO MANCINI, COMPARING MEDIA SYSTEMS

229-30 (2004); see also Enrique Armijo, Media Ownership Regulation: A ComparativePerspective,37
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 421 (2009) (comparing public interest broadcast ownership by nation). Indeed,
less than fifty percent of the current funding for PBS actually comes from government sources. HALLIN
& MANCINI, supra, at 229-30. Instead, current public broadcasting is heavily subsidized by charitable
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2. Spectrum Fee as Waiver of Public Interest Obligations
With regard to the second approach-the spectrum fee, which serves as the basis
of the other pay models-its proponent, former FCC General Counsel Henry
Geller, contends that broadcasters "should be relieved of public interest
programming responsibilities and [should] instead pay public broadcasters to serve
these non-market public interest goals with high-quality programming."'3 2 6 Given
their continued free use of the spectrum and the general failure of the public trustee
approach thus far, he proposes that they should pay a minimal fee of three percent
of broadcasters' gross advertising revenues. 327 The government would then funnel
this money to the Corporation for Public Broadcasting ("CPB") or a similar
entity. 328 That entity would in turn then have the financial ability to produce
higher quality public programming. 329 Under this model, broadcasters would still
be beholden to certain minimal standards, including payola and indecency
restrictions, closed captioning and sponsor identification. 330

Critics have asserted

that the major problem with the spectrum fee model is that it promotes a monopoly
by putting most, if not all, of the production of such programming in the hands of
the PBS network, which could lead to the inefficient use of its resources due to lack
of competition. 331 It could also lead to increased attacks of cultural elitism or
leftist bias, which could in turn pose a threat to continued government
subsidization. 332 Furthermore, by relegating political news and public affairs
contributions from both individuals and corporations. Id. Therefore, merely enhancing the current
public trustee model may obligate the government to bear some of the cost (through general or specific
taxes), although under nearly all of the models, it appears the candidate, e.g., politicians, will retain at
least partial responsibility for the cost of their own messages. This portion of the cost allocation has
historically touched upon issues of campaign finance reform, and some, including the Advisory
Committee, have advocated doing away with LUR fees entirely, and instead requiring broadcasters to
allocate free airtime for candidates. See Tracy Westen, A Proposal: Media Access for All Candidates
and Ballot Measures, in DIGITAL BROADCASTING AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST, supra note 145, at 335,
342.
326. Campbell, supranote 311, at 3, 17.
327. Id. at 18. Some scholars have proposed variations on Geller's original spectrum fee model,
such as charging the spectrum fee not as a portion of gross revenues, but instead as a transfer tax
whenever a station changes hands. Id. Some view this form of fee collection as more palatable to
broadcasters, as they may now incorporate this tax into their future contracts and negotiations prior to
any transfer of ownership, rather than being charged a new fee on something, which they may have
already owned for many years without such fee. Id. at 28.
328. Varona, supra note 143, at 92. Other proposed modifications to Geller's original concept
include having the fees collected and distributed by a new organization, modeled after the National
Endowment for the Arts or the Ad Council, which would be in place to specifically serve the purpose of
enforcing the public interest standard and would be responsible for collecting fees and buying and
redistributing public interest programs and fees. Campbell, supra note 311, at 28. This idea for a new
entity to oversee public interest enforcement also resonates in the pay and compete model. See infra
Part III.B.
329. Varona, supra note 143, at 92.
330. Campbell, supranote 311, at 18; see also Geller, supra note 312, at 230-31.
331. Wildman & Frazer, supranote 313, at 214.
332. Legislators have been among those alleging public broadcasting's leftist leanings which
could, as in the past, pose a threat to any sources of government funding to PBS and hence a threat to the
provision of political news and public interest programming premised solely on PBS producing it.
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programming to public broadcasting, it could have the de facto effect of once again
bifurcating political news from other television content, of discouraging
broadcasters from voluntarily airing such programming and of limiting the political
discourse to those that are self-inclined to follow it on public broadcasting without
drawing in those that are not so inclined. 33
3. Pay a Fee Plus Broadcast Access to Political Candidates
The third proposed approach-the pay plus access model-is a "hybrid of the
spectrum fee and public trustee approaches." 334 It attempts to address one of the
critiques of the spectrum fee model, namely that it would fail to draw in broader
participatory audiences. 335 By retaining the right to access rule, which requires
broadcasters to give candidates access to the airwaves for a fee during election
season,336 the pay plus access model could theoretically achieve that goal. 337 More
specifically, under this model, broadcasters would in a sense be required to allow
political candidates to bring the message to the people via discounted paid
advertisement aired during regular broadcast programming. However, the pay plus
access model does not address another major criticism of the spectrum fee model,
namely the potential monopolization of public interest programming, because the
fee under this model is still paid to a public broadcast338entity that would be
delegated the sole responsibility for providing such content.

Varona, supra note 143, at 93-94; see also Robert Corn-Revere, Self-Regulation andthe Public Interest,
in DIGITAL BROADCASTING AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST, supra note 145, at 63, 74 (discussing the history
of the prevailing conservative viewpoint that PBS is "biased toward the left").
333. Campbell, supranote 311, at 29.
334. Wildman & Frazer, supra note 313, at 204.
335. See id. at 205.
336. Id. In addition, this model proposes free, rather than discounted, access. Wildman & Frazer,
supra note 313, at 204-05. In doing so, it address the unequal exposure of candidates that results when
access was based on paying (albeit at a reduced rate) for political airtime to campaign. Id. Policy
analyst, Tracey Westen, has written considerably on the idea of universally accessible media access for
all candidates/ballot measures to address campaign finance inequities in purchasing airtime. See
generally Westen, supranote 325. This model does not, however, address the problems that some have
highlighted regarding the poor quality and content of such ads that focus on sound bites rather than
substance, a problem that is beyond the scope of this Article. In response to this problem, others have
suggested that candidates be required to personally appear in such ads to discuss their position on the
issues themselves and to not purchase any additional airtime. Geller, supra note 312, at 235.
337. Campbell, supra note 311, at 30 ("It promotes the ideal of a public square, that is, to have
some basic level of common knowledge in society."). Moreover, to encourage more of a participatory
discourse, others have extended on the "access" portion of this model by advocating that broadcasters be
required to promote and advertise public interest programming on their airwaves and to allocate "a
certain amount of time . . .for leasing by third parties to promote a diversity of viewpoints." Id.
Because, however, the FCC would have to retain a prominent role in enforcing lease access time, it is
unlikely the FCC could meet this demand, given its past failures at enforcing similar policies currently
in effect. See Donna N. Lampert, Cable Television: Does Leased Access Mean Least Access?, in
CABLE TELEVISION LEASED ACCESS (The Annenberg Washington Program in Commc'n Policy Studies
of Northwestern Univ. ed., 1991) (discussing the failure of the current leased access scheme to
effectively serve the public interest in any meaningful way).
338. Campbell, supra note 311, at 30
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4. Pay a Fee or Fulfill Public Interest Obligations
The fourth approach-the pay or play model-potentially avoids such
centralization, however, by introducing some flexibility into the spectrum fee/pay
plus access models. Specifically, it provides broadcasters the option of retaining
some of their traditional deliberative role by fulfilling predetermined public interest
obligations themselves, or of waving such obligation and paying another entity, like
public broadcasting, for doing so. 339 There are two different versions of the pay or
play model: the "spectrum check-off' variant and the "tradable obligations"
version. 340 Moreover, market oriented proponents and critics of the enhanced
public trustee or spectrum fee approaches would more than likely appreciate a
corporations' ability, under this model, to bargain for the most efficient end.34i
While the pay or play approach seems to promote efficiency because a
broadcaster in the best position to meet certain public interest obligations would
end up doing so under the tradable obligations approach, the net result could again
be a provision of critical information through one or very few sources. 342 If
broadcasters repeatedly traded obligations or paid their way out of their obligations
under the spectrum check off approach to the few stations most inclined to air
political messages or public interest programming, such content could eventually
appear solely on those stations, thereby potentially reaching again only a small
portion of the viewing public. 343 Finally, with little incentive to produce quality
public interest programming, broadcasters may produce inferior content to avoid
having to pay another; this hazard would introduce the need for strict quality
control regulations regarding content that might run afoul of first amendment
protections.344

339. Id.
340. Wildman & Frazer, supra note 313, at 206. The tradable obligations variant is based
primarily on its success in implementing the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments. Campbell, supra note
311, at 31 ("[The Clean Air] Act established a scheme for reducing sulfur dioxide emissions by
allocating firms a fixed number of 'emission allowances' that they could use, bank for future use, buy
from other companies, or sell to other companies").
341. Campbell, supra note 311, at 32-33. The government would need to be heavily involved in
oversight of the trading of obligations. Wildman & Frazer, supra note 313, at 206. This model has,
however, gained supporters because it also has the potential of encouraging public and private
broadcasters to negotiate and work together in new and inventive ways. Campbell, supra note 311, at
33.
342. Wildman & Frazer, supra note 313, at 206, 207 ("[Tlhe obligations check-off model .. has
the potential to fail completely in this regard, should broadcasters decide to buy their way out of these
obligations entirely.").
343. Id. at 207.
344. Campbell, supra note 311, at 33-34 (discussing some of the first amendment implications of
enforcement of programming standards upon broadcasters). Some have convincingly asserted that
public trustee regulation falls within constitutional bounds as it is currently enforced. See, e.g., Geller,
supra note 312, at 237-42. Other scholars remain concerned that more aggressive public interest
regulation measures may run afoul of the "First Amendment [which] forbids government from deciding
what material citizens 'shall read and see' or 'distinguishling] between good novels and bad ones."'
Corn-Revere, supra note 332, at 72.
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ADOPTING A SLIGHTLY MODIFIED PAY TO COMPETE APPROACH

With the pay and compete model endorsed by this Article, many of the positive
qualities of all of the previous models are retained while the gaps in efficiency and
effectiveness are filled, all without sacrificing broadcast's traditional deliberative
function of sustaining an engaged and informed electorate. 345 This model takes the
"play" option out of the fourth approach-the pay or play model, which allowed a
broadcaster to fulfill public interest obligations itself in lieu of paying another
entity to do so. By removing the play option, this model essentially then converts
the scheme back to the spectrum fee model that required a broadcaster to pay a fee
to a public broadcasting entity for its license to continue broadcasting on the
nation's airwaves. 346 Similarly, under this model, the fee would be paid to a public
authority that would operate as "a buyer of public interest programming and access
time, spending from a budget comprised of broadcaster payments plus funds
available from other sources, such as government funding and private
donations."347
In addition, under this model, although the "play" option is removed, it is
replaced by the "compete" component, which provides the broadcaster the
opportunity to earn back fees paid by choosing to compete in the creation of high
quality public interest programming. 348 With such market incentive, the pay and
compete model erases the efficiency concern of the pay or play model where
broadcasters had no incentive in fulfilling such obligations and could possibly
relieve themselves of such obligations by buying out of them completely and
transferring such obligation, for a fee, to a public broadcasting entity. Under this
model, the broadcaster is incentivized by the option to earn back fees paid. An
additional plus is that it increases healthy competition to produce quality content.
Under this model, if broadcasters choose to compete to earn back fees they find
themselves in competition with other broadcasters attempting also to earn back fees
paid, as well as with the public broadcaster. A public broadcaster might initially
345. Geller, supra note 312, at 242-43 (maintaining that the greatest public interest need is
twofold: "broadcasting and education, and broadcasting and the political arena"); see also Westen,
supra note 325, at 350.
346. Wildman & Frazer, supra note 313, at 218.
347. Id. at 218-19 ("[A] public interest authority [will be] commissioned to develop and oversee
public interest programming. This is pay-plus-compete for a public buyer."). While the exact nature of
such public authority needs a bit more analytical development, some have postulated that it could be "a
specially designated nonprofit entity as well as a government agency." Id. at 225 n.14. Another
suggestion is that it could be made up of smaller authorities all drawing from the same budget and
operating as branches of the larger public system with each unit designated its own area of public
interest broadcasting specialty. Id. This Article suggests that it could also promote other traditional
FCC public trustee policy goals like local, diverse and children's educational programming. Others
envision a newly retooled (though perhaps entirely independent) Corporation for Public Broadcasting.
Id. at 218-19, 225 n.14. Still others suggest the inclusion of an IRS accounting and oversight facet to
any new organization tasked with evaluating public broadcasting. See MCCHESNEY & NICHOLS, supra
note 15, at 202 (discussing the Internal Revenue Service's involvement in operating a citizen media
voucher program where the public receives government funds to donate to their desired public affairs
program, which thereby necessitates IRS involvement).
348. Wildman & Frazer, supra note 313, at 219.
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have the upper hand since it has traditionally produced such programming and
might, as a result, be in a better position initially to receive the much needed
funds. 349 The authority could commission the broadcaster (public or commercial)
deemed most suitable to produce such programming or could compensate a
broadcaster to the extent it created such programming. Moreover, the pay and
compete model most effectively strikes the careful balance between a corporation's
profit driven interests and the need to inform and engage the public through
350
verifiable, critical and engaging broadcast journalism.
Finally, with such built in incentives and criteria for earning back paid fees,
there would be no need then to retain the bona fide news exemptions; broadcasters
would be more inclined to provide political news with the prospect of being paid
back for doing so. Any program, whether presented in a traditional news
programming or public affairs format or in an entertaining one, can qualify the
broadcaster to earn back their fees. Such program must, however, provide political
news which meets the basic criteria ultimately established by the public authority,
and must receive a designated amount of broad-based viewership support as
established by ratings data or by public charitable donations. 351 As it relates
specifically to the provision of political news, the public authority could use
various criteria (such as audience viewership, verifiability of information and
diversity in viewpoints and opinions) on which to judge potential public interest
programming provided on varied and352creative formats that not only inform, but also
engage and widen the public sphere.
As a precautionary note, however, it is suggested that the right to access and
equal time requirements be retained to ensure that politicians are guaranteed access
to the airwaves and are granted access to it equally. Such access fees should be
fully subsidized by the public authority in return for a political candidates' promise
not to purchase any additional airtime. 353 Additionally, the broadcaster should be
349. Id.; see also MCCHESNEY & NICHOLS, supra note 15, at 104 (discussing the successes
attached to engaging and sustaining the political discourse when there is a viable public broadcasting
system aptly poised to compete with commercial broadcasters).
350. Wildman & Frazer, supra note 313, at 219 ("The primary advantage of the pay-plus-compete
for a public buyer model is that it tums public service obligations into opportunities for profit that would
enlist the natural incentives of competitive markets on behalf of the goals served by public interest
broadcasting.").
351. MCCHESNEY & NICHOLS, supra note 15, at 201-02 (considering the concept of the
"Citizenship News Voucher" where the government would issue $200 vouchers to the public who in
turn donates it to their public interest programming of choice or the public authority in support of such
programming). But see Adam Thierer & Berin Szoka, The Wrong Way to Reinvent Media, Part 3:
Media Vouchers, PROGRESS ON POINT 17.4, Apr. 2010, at 5 (illustrating the opposition to McChesney
and Nichols's plan, and denying that informative media should be recognized as a public good akin to
education).
352. MCCHESNEY & NICHOLS, supra note 15, at 191; see FULLER, supra note 17, at 210
(discussing a potential industry created self regulating criteria for developing and sustaining political
news); Wildman & Frazer, supranote 313, at 219.
353. The pay and compete model allows for a better common ground between broadcaster's profits
and the need for sufficient political campaign time, without reverting to LUR or forcing candidates to
skirt campaign finance reform efforts. See Wildman & Frazer, supra note 313, at 219-20. This model
creates a transparency that is lacking in any of the previously mentioned models, "requir[ing] the public
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required to disclose any such candidate's use to all of the other qualifying
candidates. 354 This model builds successfully upon the foundations of the previous
models and the traditional public trustee approach to television's public interest
obligations. It allows corporations to operate with their own bottom lines in mind
while also creating incentives for television broadcasters to both retain and engage
viewers and to create high quality public interest programming without being
offered the option of buying out of such obligations upfront, as with the pay for
play model. 355 Paying a fee upfront should spark sufficient creativity from
enterprising broadcasters interested in earning back their fees and perhaps earning
even more profit in the process. 356 Moreover, the pay and compete model should
not raise any first amendment concerns, given that the government is not
determining what commercial broadcasters can air appropriately as public interest
programming. Instead, the public authority would be commissioning programs
from broadcasters, who choose to participate or opt out on their own accord.357
IV. CONCLUSION
The slightly modified pay and compete model, which retains the right to access
and equal time requirements, is consistent with first amendment ideals. As
discussed herein, the First Amendment, specifically via the early Republic's
interpretations and implementations of the freedom of the press and speech clauses,
enshrines the protection not only of communication itself but also of the
deliberating and participatory infrastructure that makes such communication
possible. This Article joins with those who view political news as a public good
and also ultimately joins in the call for a revived investigative journalism, which is
now in peril due to the spectacle that predominates network news and to the
growing loss in viewers. 358 It stops short of endorsing a call for a renewed
allegiance to a foregone journalistic standard that insists on separating political
news or traditional news programming from entertaining formats. The point
instead is that the format alone is, and should not be, dispositive in determining the
deliberative value of information provided on such format, lest times revert back to
a top down "Uncle Walter" determination of what the news is or what it should
look like. 359 The answer also does not lie in gutting the very vitality and substance

authority to pay market-negotiated prices for access." Id. at 219. Under the pay and compete model, the
public authority may actually be in the unique position of being able to subsidize (at least partially) the
ad time needed for candidates, thus allowing the broadcaster to receive the full market value of the
airtime, while still allowing the candidate the opportunity to air their message potentially for free. Id.at
220.
354. Sunstein, supra note 41, at 531.
355. Wildman & Frazer, supranote 313, at 218-19.
356. Id.at 223.
357. See Westen, supra note 145, at 59 n. 1 (discussing the difference between "affirmative" and
"negative" broadcast regulation as it relates to first amendment permissibility).
358. MCCHESNEY & NICHOLS, supra note 15, at 102.
359. Michael Ventre, Cronkite Was America's Favorite Uncle, MSNBC (July 17, 2009),
http://today.msnbc.msn.com/id/9600957/ns/today-entertainment/.
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of political news, or by rubber stamping the current commercialization and
spectacle of network news. 360 This Article posits that the law should instead
proactively facilitate the provision of political news, be it in a traditional news
format and/or an entertaining one, and the development of a media infrastructure
that best serves the nation's democratic and participatory goals. Adopting the pay
and compete approach to facilitating such deliberative goals on broadcast is a step
361
in that direction.

360. BAYM, supra note 1, at 176 ("It seems unlikely and undesirable [to] revert to an older posture
of professionalism, that top-down paradigm of dispassionate informational expertise.").
361.
While this Article has focused primarily on broadcast television, the hope is that giving due
attention to this medium and its deliberative potential will have positive reverberations for a more
inclusive public sphere and a political news and journalism infrastructure that is inclusive of the Internet,
cable/satellite and even, optimistically, print.

